


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JPRS-USA-86-008

26 AUGUST 1986



USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 5, MAY 1986

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26 AUGUST 1986

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 5, May 1986

[Translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.]

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 5, May 1986

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhev

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : May 1986

Signed to press : 16 April 1986

Copies : 30,000

COPYRIGHT : Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika,
politika, ideologiya", 1986

EDITORIAL URGES DISARMAMENT, MUTUAL SECURITY, NEGOTIATIONS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 3-9

[Editorial: "For a World Without Wars or Violence"]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress discussed and approved a program of action of truly revolutionary nature and scale. Its work was distinguished by a Leninist exacting and thorough analysis of domestic issues and the international situation. It entered the lives of communists and of all Soviet people with bold decisions and a passionate appeal for new accomplishments.

"Time To Move Ahead!"--this legendary slogan of the first five-year plans was revived in the minds of those who kept track of the work of the supreme CPSU forum. Our country is entering an important stage in its development. The party wants to put society on a qualitatively new level within a short period of time. The CPSU Program and the political report of the Central Committee to the congress call for resolute reforms in the economy, social policy and spiritual life. Socioeconomic progress must be stepped up considerably through the extensive use of the achievements of the technological revolution and the updating of forms of socialist economic management to meet the conditions and requirements of the present day. These problems are difficult and new because traditional methods and practices of economic management, which took shape over decades, must be resolutely rebuilt, and efforts must be made to surmount the inertia of the thinking, habits and established relationships that are propelling the country along the path of extensive development, a well-trodden path but one no longer meeting the requirements of the present day. The party defines this objective as the accomplishment of a radical transition to intensive growth.

It is not only the domestic situation that has reached a turning point. Never in the postwar decades has the world situation been as explosive as in the first half of the 1980's. The extreme rightwing groups ruling the United States and some other leading NATO countries abruptly turned away from international detente to a policy of open confrontation and forcible pressure. The Washington administration is still trying to build up its nuclear strength and militarize space. Today's world as a whole and the development of international relations have now reached the point at which any further steps in this direction would plunge them into the abyss of nuclear self-annihilation.

The arms race imperialism started has already led to the accumulation of more than 40,000 nuclear projectiles throughout the world. This is the current result of the futile but extremely dangerous attempts of U.S. ruling circles and their allies to attain military-strategic superiority to the socialist world. All postwar history attests to imperialism's misguided persistence in its efforts to use the greatest achievements of the human intellect to secure itself a leading position in the world by developing new, more refined and barbarous weapons. Thermonuclear synthesis and the latest achievements in chemistry, biology, electronics and aerospace technology are all being placed at the service of hegemonic ambitions in the West.

Imperialism's attempts to break out of the bounds of military parity are leading to the stockpiling of new mountains of weapons, undermining strategic stability and depreciating arms limitation agreements. A "balance of terror" or a balance of "assured destruction" is imperialism's basis of international relations, a fragile and unproductive basis which could cause worldwide catastrophe. In recent decades all countries and peoples have ceased to have any say in matters pertaining to their own lives and deaths, as if all mankind had become a convict on death row. The millions of people who have been put in the position of nuclear hostages will not allow this to go on.

The new American plans to spread the arms race to space are not merely the latest attempt to issue dictates to the socialist countries. A military-technical response to this attempt will be found, if necessary. But the implementation of these plans will qualitatively change the situation and sharply diminish the possibility of the political control of events. "The world situation," M. S. Gorbachev said from the congress rostrum, "could reach the point at which it will no longer depend on the mind or will of politicians. It will be ruled by technology and by the logic of military technocracy."¹ Human civilization will fall victim to a monster of its own making. It is already extremely difficult to start a dialogue on disarmament, and tomorrow it will be even harder, if not impossible.

At this turning point in world history, socialism, which fundamentally rejects war as a means of resolving intergovernmental conflicts and ideological disagreements, has proposed an innovative and scientifically sound program of joint actions by all countries to save mankind from the threat of self-immolation. The political thinking of statesmen must be brought in line with the realities of the international situation. Changes in contemporary world development are so profound and significant that they require the reinterpretation and comprehensive analysis of all factors. The atmosphere of nuclear confrontation calls for new approaches, methods and forms of interrelations between different social systems, states and regions. All countries without exception have a fundamental duty not to ignore social, political and ideological conflicts, to learn the science and art of restraint and circumspect behavior in the international arena and to live in a civilized manner, in an atmosphere of correct international communication and cooperation. "Today's world is too small and too fragile for wars and power politics," the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress stresses. "The only way to save and preserve it is to put an end,

decisively and irreversibly, to ways of thinking and acting that have been based for centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts."²

States must reassess their approach to means and methods of safeguarding their foreign policy interests, especially the main one--security. It cannot always be based on the fear of retaliation. We can only applaud the talk in Washington about the immorality of nuclear weapons and of the maintenance of security with the threat of mutual (and, we could add, worldwide) destruction. But what kind of solution are they proposing in Washington? People there want to use human genius and billions in resources to develop an antimissile space weapon, which will supposedly make nuclear weapons useless and obsolete in the future. They are suggesting that the arms race on earth be stopped by transferring it to space.

The Soviet Union and the CPSU propose a qualitatively different approach to the guaranteed security of each state. We believe that the nature of modern weapons leaves no country the hope of defending itself only with the aid of military-technical means. Guaranteed security must be regarded as a political objective and must be attained by exclusively political means.

The USSR asks the United States and NATO to acknowledge the objective fact that security today can only be mutual, or only universal in the context of the world as a whole. "Everyone must feel equally secure," speakers stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, "because the fears and anxieties of the nuclear age engender unpredictability in policy and concrete action."³ The Soviet side has repeatedly announced on the highest level that it is not striving to change the strategic balance in its own favor: This would make the other side more suspicious and would heighten overall instability. Of course, the USSR hopes that the United States and its allies will reciprocate. This would pave the way for a mutual understanding on the level of weapons each side might consider to be relatively adequate from the standpoint of reliable defense. It is already obvious that existing arsenals are several times in excess of this level. The acknowledgement of the principle of mutual security and the abandonment of attempts to base security on the diminished security of the other side would make it possible to stop the arms race and begin dismantling and reducing nuclear arsenals with the aim of reaching a strategic balance on the lowest possible level, a level which should completely exclude nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The USSR is ready to take this kind of action. The party congress reendorsed the broad-scale program of specific steps proposed at the beginning of the year to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, reduce conventional arms and armed forces and improve international relations radically on this basis. These proposals specifically envisage a 50-percent reduction in nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other side within the next 5-8 years, with the mutual renunciation of the development, testing and deployment of space attack weapons by the USSR and the United States. The USSR's new approach to the problem of intermediate-range weapons in Europe could provide a real opportunity to remove all American and Soviet missiles of this category from the continent within the same period. The Soviet Union

has asked all nuclear powers to begin negotiations with the aim of eliminating tactical weapons by the middle of the 1990's and all other nuclear weapons by the end of the century. A radical program has been proposed for the destruction of chemical weapons and the industrial facilities for their production under strict international control. The purpose of the Soviet initiatives is to guarantee mankind a peaceful sky and peaceful space in the third millenium and firm confidence in the survival of life on earth.

Our country is boldly traveling its part of the road in international affairs, resolutely clearing all of the obstructions created by decades of mutual suspicion. To facilitate the conclusion of major agreements on disarmament, the USSR has taken a number of important unilateral actions: It has suspended nuclear tests, imposed a moratorium on the emplacement of antisatellite weapons in space, stopped the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe and reduced the number of existing missiles here. Important initiatives were put forth at the talks in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm. Dialogue on the summit level between East and West has been resumed, including dialogue with the United States of America.

"Looking back over the past year," M. S. Gorbachev said at the congress, "it is easy to see that the prerequisites for the improvement of the international situation are beginning, judging by all indications, to take shape. But prerequisites for a change are not the same thing as the change."⁴ It will take a great deal of effort to resolutely oppose international reactionary forces with the will of broad strata of the world public. Today it is more important than ever before to seek opportunities for closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, public organizations and movements concerned about the future of the world and with all people for the establishment of an all-encompassing system of international security.

The congress of the Soviet Communists put forth a number of specific and realistic principles which can and must lie at the basis of this system. In the military sphere our country is asking the nuclear powers to renounce wars against each other or against third states--both nuclear and conventional; to keep the arms race out of space, to stop all nuclear tests and to eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons; to ban and destroy chemical weapons and to renounce the development of other weapons of mass annihilation. It proposes a transition to the strictly controlled lowering of the levels of the military potential of states to the point of reasonable adequacy; the dissolution of military alliances and, as a first step toward this, the refusal to expand them or form new ones; the commencement of the balanced and proportional reduction of military budgets.

In the political sphere the USSR advocates unconditional respect for the right of each nation to sovereignly choose the means and forms of its development and the just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts. The Soviet Union has called upon all countries to plan measures to strengthen trust between states and the inviolability of borders and to create effective safeguards against attack; to find effective methods of preventing international terrorism and guaranteeing safe international land, air and sea travel.

In the economic sphere the USSR proposes that all forms of discrimination be excluded from international practices and that economic blockades and sanctions be renounced, with the exception of those specifically stipulated in the recommendations of the world community. The Soviet Union requests states to join in a collective search for fair solutions to the problem of indebtedness, of establishing a new world economic order and of guaranteeing the equal economic security of all countries. It is also important to work out the general principles of the use of part of the funds which will be made available by the reduction of military budgets for the good of the world community, especially the developing countries, with a view to the need for united effort in the peaceful use of space and the resolution of global problems on which the future of civilization depends.

In the humanitarian sphere our country is appealing for cooperation in the dissemination of the ideals of peace, disarmament and international security, for a higher level of overall objective awareness, for the mutual familiarization of nations with one another's ways of life and for the reinforcement of the spirit of mutual understanding and agreement in relations between them. Genocide and apartheid must be eradicated, and sermons preaching fascism and any other form of racial, national or religious exclusivity and discrimination against people on this basis must be ended. We advocate broader international cooperation--with respect for the laws of each country--in the guarantee of the individual's political, social and personal rights, the resolution of problems in the reunification of families and the authorization of marriages in a humane and positive spirit, the development of contacts between individuals and organizations, the search for new forms and the reinforcement of old forms of cooperation in the spheres of culture, the arts, science, education and medicine.

These principles, which we believe should lie at the basis of the system of international security, stem logically from the new edition of the CPSU Program approved by the congress. They are based on a realistic assessment of the main tendency in social development today, consisting in the combination of competition between the two systems and the growing interdependence of states in the world community. In an interdependent and integral world, confrontations between capitalism and socialism must only take the form of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry. Proceeding from this belief, the 27th CPSU Congress asked the leaders of all countries to organize regular dialogue--bilateral and multilateral--within the framework of the proposed bases of the international security system with the aim of establishing peaceful coexistence as the supreme universal principle of intergovernmental relations. This appeal is primarily addressed to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, who bear the greatest responsibility for the future of mankind.

The foreign policy line worked out by the congress for the Soviet Union has evoked widespread responses in political and public circles in all countries. The world press, including the American press, and prominent U.S. politicians and arms experts have noted the realistic and constructive nature of the Soviet initiatives, particularly with regard to the cessation of nuclear tests and the removal of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe. "The USSR proposal on a total and universal nuclear test ban," said G. Seaborg,

the famous American scientist and Nobel Prize winner, for example, "seems especially promising and is completely realistic, timely and feasible." On 26 February the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress approved a resolution asking the administration to resume talks without delay for the drafting of a treaty on a total and universal nuclear test ban. Although the resolution is not binding, it clearly indicates the attitude of the majority of congressmen toward this major Soviet initiative.

The U.S. response to the Soviet initiatives on the eve of the congress, however, testifies that ruling circles in this country do not regard the elimination of nuclear weapons as a primary objective and have not given up the intention to use them to attain political goals. This is precisely why the White House has verbally agreed to the need to reduce nuclear arsenals but is demanding that the USSR first stop supporting friendly states and make concessions in bilateral relations.

The desire to keep nuclear weapons and to carry out the "Star Wars" plans at any cost was also the reason for Washington's abrupt negative response to the USSR proposal that all tests of these weapons be stopped and that the drafting of the appropriate international agreement be commenced in earnest. When the precise and unambiguous explanation of the Soviet position on the issue of verification caused references to it as the main obstacle in the negotiation process to lose all credibility in the eyes of the world public, the United States frankly announced that it would continue the tests "as long as it has to rely on its nuclear deterrence forces." By doing this, it implied that the need for tests would disappear after the implementation of the SDI, which is, according to official logic, supposed to make nuclear weapons unnecessary. The underground tests being conducted now, however, are aimed not only at the improvement of nuclear weapons, but also at the development of combat lasers using the energy of atomic explosions, lasers which are supposed to be an important element of the SDI. This means that Washington has no intention of actually stopping the tests even in the future.

Of course, if the main goal is the buildup and improvement of weapons, they must be tested. But the complete realization that all of the new weapon stockpiles cannot strengthen security but, rather, will undermine it, will necessitate the political decision to stop the senseless and dangerous race and, as a first step toward this goal, to stop the tests. "It is precisely in the issue of nuclear tests, the cessation of which is being demanded by the entire world, that the reluctance of the United States and its ruling forces to begin nuclear disarmament is most clearly apparent," the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Congress stresses.⁵

There is also no apparent U.S. willingness to eliminate the intermediate-range missiles in Europe on a mutual basis with the USSR. Instead, there is the slightly updated (after all, it has been 5 years!) "zero option," pertaining to Soviet missiles of similar categories in the eastern regions of our country while keeping American nuclear forces in this zone intact. The American response expressed negative feelings about the Soviet proposal regarding English and French nuclear weapons. But the conditions stipulated by the USSR, that England and France not build up their own nuclear arsenals during the

removal of Soviet and American missiles and that the United States pledge not to supply other countries with strategic missiles and intermediate-range missiles, have been widely acknowledged as fair conditions in Europe and America.

Something else warrants discussion. Some American newspapers have reported that the White House chose the toughest of several varieties of response to the Soviet Union on the question of intermediate-range missiles under the influence of its allies. It is true that Washington emissaries held consultations in the capitals of Europe and Asia (including Beijing) when the American position was being drafted, and this is viewed in the West as evidence of agreement and interaction by the allies. But why did this interaction have only a negative impact, promote a tougher position and impede the resolution of the problem? Why should the Western nuclear powers not begin working out a joint constructive position on the Euromissiles with the same degree of unity and consensus and with a view to the actual situation on the continent, where the nuclear weapons of the USSR are opposed by the nuclear weapons of three countries?

The problem apparently stems from the lack of desire to seriously consider nuclear disarmament. When Western politicians were asked directly from the party congress rostrum whether they would be willing to give up nuclear weapons in the future, their response was actually negative. All of this reaffirms the belief, expressed at the congress, that we are dealing with a society whose ruling circles do not want to take a sober look at the realities of the world and its future or to draw serious conclusions from their own experience and that of others. At the same time that appeals for realism and a new approach to the issue of security were being addressed to the entire world from the Kremlin, the American President made an anti-Soviet speech to his nation, frightening his fellow Americans with the "Soviet threat." The speech contained the usual set of propaganda cliches and was made with the equally usual aim of gaining a new increase in Pentagon allocations from the Congress.

Many speeches of this kind have been presented in the 1980's, some of them even more scathing, but this one stands out, and not only because it is the latest. It was the first speech after the Geneva meeting and it indicated the lack of change in the White House's approach to international relations and the issue of war and peace. Quoting George Washington, the President repeated the old adage that preparation for war is one of the most effective ways of keeping the peace. He asked Americans "not to discard America's trump card" at a time when the United States was seated at the negotiating table with the USSR--that is, he asked them to give the Pentagon as many billions as it wants. Once again, there is the traditional "cardplayer's" approach to negotiations, the same tendency to view politics as a game in which a point for one side is a defeat for the other! This formula is completely unsuitable and dangerous in the nuclear age: "If you want peace, prepare for war."

Ruling circles in the United States are obviously losing their realistic outlook at this turning point in history. Militarist forces are striving to perpetuate confrontation, undermine the Soviet-American dialogue and blame the USSR for all of this. After exposing the intentions of those who want

the Soviet Union to "slam the door," the party congress said that the focus of foreign policy would be "firmness in the defense of our principles and positions, tactical flexibility, the willingness to make mutually acceptable compromises and the promotion of dialogue and mutual understanding."⁶ An important step in the pursuit of this policy was taken at the end of March, when M. S. Gorbachev proposed a meeting with the American President in the near future for the negotiation of a total ban on nuclear tests.

The 27th CPSU Congress will enter history as a major event in the life of the party and the Soviet state and as a congress of innovators. A new way of political thinking and new approaches to problems in internal development and international relations are the communist response to the most urgent needs of today's world. "On behalf of the CPSU," the resolution on the Central Committee Political Report says, "the congress addresses all governments, parties, public organizations and movements truly concerned about the future of peace on earth and all peoples with an appeal for closer and more productive cooperation for success in the fight against wars; success which will represent a historic victory for all mankind and for each individual on our planet."⁷

The foreign policy strategy announced at the congress is a strategy of preserving human civilization and establishing a safe world; it is a program of concrete action against nuclear war and the arms race.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. S. Gorbachev, "Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress, 25 February 1986," Moscow, 1986, p 83.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p 82.
4. Ibid., p 90.
5. Ibid., p 87.
6. PRAVDA, 6 March 1986.
7. Ibid.

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FROM NO TO YES: WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO SDI EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 32-43

[Article by S. A. Karaganov: "'Star Wars' and Western Europe"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The United States' so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) has already been poisoning East-West relations, escalating the arms race and threatening the arms limitation process for 3 years now. The destructive role of the "Star Wars" concept became particularly apparent after the Soviet-American summit meeting, which seemed to pave the way for a turn for the better in world politics.

But the effects of the SDI on international relations are not confined to this. In particular, it has turned into almost the central problem in American-West European relations and has exposed their sore spots.

There is no question that the West European countries have conflicting feelings about the SDI. On the one hand, Great Britain signed a "memorandum on mutual understanding" with Washington, agreeing to cooperate in SDI-related research.¹ The Italian Cabinet of Ministers approved of participation by its firms in this research. Bonn concluded an agreement on participation by West German firms in SDI research. On the other hand, the governments of France, Denmark, Norway and Greece, and of two other developed capitalist countries, Canada and Australia, refused to support this research but did not prohibit participation by their firms in it. At the same time, the governments of Western Europe are expressing doubts about the very concept of the SDI, the idea of starting an arms race in the sphere of antimissile systems and the emplacement of weapons in space, and do not believe that the ABM Treaty should be undermined.

What Frightens Western Europe?

The immediate reaction in Western Europe to the President's speech of 23 March 1983, in which he announced the "Strategic Defense Initiative," was pointedly negative. When FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner was interviewed at the beginning of April 1983, he essentially expressed the opinion of all of his colleagues in Western Europe when he said that the SDI would "destabilize

the West European balance," "separate Western Europe from the United States and threaten the collapse of the Western alliance." Similar but slightly milder statements were made in other West European capitals.² In June 1984 France, obviously disturbed by the U.S. intentions, submitted a proposal to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament which was almost completely contrary to Washington's position and was obviously directed against its "initiative." "The very declaration of the intention to move ahead in the improvement of antimissile systems will escalate the buildup of offensive weapons," the French delegate said. The measures Paris proposed included a moratorium on the testing of directed energy weapons to reaffirm the spirit of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM).³ France's proposal was supported by other West European countries, particularly the FRG.

Later, Washington's pressure and its maneuvers, which will be discussed below, muffled official protests; some capitals have agreed to cooperate with it in SDI research. But the very idea of starting an arms race in the sphere of antimissile systems arouses fear in Western Europe. After all, this is contrary to the vital interests of the West European states. In what specific ways?

In Great Britain and France there is the valid fear that an arms race in the ABM sphere could undermine the effectiveness of their strategic potential, which is of value to London and Paris from the military standpoint, and even more from the political standpoint, as a means of upholding the prestige of these states and their status.⁴ People in England and France are also afraid that the escalation of the race for offensive weapons by the American plans for ABM systems will diminish the political and military significance of the plans to build up the strategic potential of these two countries and will compel them to spend even more on nuclear forces.

There is considerable worry in Western Europe about the effects of the U.S. plans on the arms limitation process and the prospects for the positive development of East-West political relations.⁵ Many West European statesmen also realize that the SDI will put the very possibility of strategic arms limitation in question. "If President Reagan continues to cling to his 'Star Wars' vision," wrote C. Bertram, renowned West German expert on strategy and former director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, "arms limitation talks will inevitably fail."⁶

The West European capitals are interested in continuing the arms limitation process mainly for political reasons. People there believe that this process will stabilize USSR-U.S. relations and give West European countries more freedom to maneuver in the foreign policy sphere.

The new American concept also worries West European leaders because of the fear that Washington's hypocritical statements that the SDI will supposedly "put an end to nuclear deterrence" and that the latter is "immoral" while "defense is moral," will deal another blow to the gravely undermined support in Western Europe for NATO's current strategy, which presupposes the first use of nuclear weapons and proceeds from the need for "nuclear deterrence through intimidation."

West European politicians are extremely disturbed by another obvious implication of the SDI--its implementation could qualitatively destabilize the strategic situation, create "strategic chaos" and increase the danger of war.⁷

The head of the military-political research program at the Royal College in London, L. Friedman, expressed these fears: "A country anticipating the loss of its ability to threaten a retaliatory strike...could be tempted to resort to cardinal measures before its position becomes completely hopeless."⁸

He also pointed out another of the anxieties of West European experts and politicians, connected with Washington's plans to deploy an "antimissile shield" over U.S. territory. In their opinion, this could strengthen elements of adventurism in American policy, and not only in relations with Western Europe. "The United States," wrote Friedman, a man with far from leftist views, "confident of its security, could begin to take much greater risks in the international arena. Its allies would then be exposed to the consequences of this behavior."⁹

The main reason for West European fears about the American plans to establish an antimissile system, however, is the realization that this system would mean the complete strategic "separation" of the United States from the European NATO members. Ruling circles in Western Europe are still interested in the NATO doctrine of "flexible response." It officially states that in the event that NATO is losing a war in Europe, the United States will deliver a "limited" strike with its strategic forces. People in the capitals of Western Europe are afraid that the reciprocal development of an ABM system by the Soviet Union would make the use of U.S. strategic forces against its territory highly improbable. Professor D. Yost from the U.S. Naval Academy studied the views of Western Europeans on the projected ABM system and wrote: "The credibility of American threats to use limited...nuclear strikes against targets in the USSR, necessary for the defense of Western Europe, will be diminished, while the threat of more massive strikes to surmount the Soviet ABM will sound even less probable."¹⁰

The SDI is arousing particular anxiety in Western Europe among those who understand the aim of U.S. long-range military policy with regard to NATO. After all, it consists in reducing the risk of the spread of a possible European war to the United States, in "limiting" it. Washington is striving to secure maximum ability to threaten the start of military operations in Europe and simultaneously maintain the military, political and technical dependence of West European countries. "The SDI is only the latest in a series of measures taken by the United States," an editorial in an influential military magazine said, "which make the West Europeans suspect that the United States plans (speaking quite frankly) to supply the equipment in any future war, while the fighting will be done mainly by West European soldiers."¹¹

The West European members of NATO are still clinging to "extended deterrence" and the "nuclear guarantees" of the United States because they are afraid that their further weakening will cause Washington to exert even stronger pressure on Western Europe to increase its military spending and build up its conventional weapons to "compensate" for the erosion of these guarantees. But this

is the peacetime scenario. In a war, people in Western Europe believe, the ABM system will be a guarantee of American "separation" from the conflict, will strengthen the position of those in Washington who can count on "limiting" it to Europe and will consequently diminish the U.S. interest in preventing it.

"The West Europeans doubt," wrote S. Hoffmann, the most famous American expert on American-West European relations, "whether America, 'in a position of safety,' will be willing to take risks to defend regions located somewhere 'on the periphery'.... As a result, Western Europe might be doomed to precisely the kind of conventional or 'limited' nuclear war that is its nightmare and that extended deterrence is supposed to prevent."¹² In essence, the SDI, by undermining the concept of "extended deterrence" and the reliability of the "nuclear guarantees," reduces the potential value of the United States to Western Europe as its "defender" in a war, as a force upholding it in a crisis. The very military necessity of the existence of NATO for Western Europe is being questioned.

The fears of the West Europeans were expressed in quite definite terms by a high-level official from the French Ministry of External Relations, B. d'Abauville. Speaking in New York on 8 November 1984, he stated that the "protective balloon" that might be hoisted over the United States as a result of the implementation of the SDI is a "severely disuniting idea" and could mean the "end of the Atlantic alliance."¹³

"The idea that the United States is protected and Western Europe is not could lead to the collapse of NATO," Director A. Pierre of the research program on American-West European relations of the New York Council on Foreign Relations said in congressional hearings in reference to these feelings.¹⁴

The reaction in Western Europe to the SDI in 1983 and 1984 disturbed Washington, and not only because it was almost completely negative. The American policy was protested less by the public (part of the public was unaware of the threat the new concept posed to Europe for a long time) than by ruling circles in West European states and experts expressing their opinions. The SDI threatened not only to provoke a new massive crisis in American-West European relations, but also to exacerbate existing differences.

Washington: The Strategy of Overcoming the Allies' Resistance

After encountering Western Europe's strong negative reaction, Washington made a vigorous effort to suppress this reaction or at least muffle it. People there were justifiably afraid that the clearly negative feelings of ruling circles and the public in Western Europe about the SDI could seriously strengthen the position of its opponents in the United States, smother the favorite child of the military-industrial complex in the cradle or at least retard and limit its development severely.

Immediate preparations were made for a propaganda campaign to undermine Western Europe's resistance. This campaign became part of a broader strategy to "sell" the "Star Wars" concept to the American and world public and get money from Congress for its implementation.

Promises were made to convince the West Europeans that the SDI would also be intended to protect the allies. In his speech of 23 March 1983, Reagan had mentioned only the goal of protection from "strategic ballistic missiles"¹⁵--that is, missiles aimed at the United States. The goal of "protecting the territory of allies" was inserted, according to several sources, only at the last minute. People in Western Europe noticed that the President was preparing to "protect" Western Europe from missiles aimed at the United States.¹⁶

Later, Washington did not repeat this mistake, and its leaders constantly reiterated that the SDI was also intended to defend the allies.¹⁷

The urgency of the matter was deliberately underplayed and the allies were promised consultations and told that no final decisions had been made yet. A Pentagon report issued in March 1984 asserted that the SDI was not "an attempt to emplace weapons.... Rather, it will lay the technical basis for an intelligent decision on deployment."¹⁸ The fans of the SDI hope that after its development has cost tens of billions of dollars, future U.S. leaders might be under so much pressure from the military-industrial complex and its allies that the deployment of any kind of system will actually be predetermined.

In 1984 Washington propaganda launched a campaign about a new U.S. "gap," similar to the "bomber gap," the "missile gap" and so forth. This time it was an ABM "gap." The President's speechwriters did not think to include a statement in the March 1983 speech to allege that the USSR had been ahead of the United States in ABM research for a long time. They were even chastised for their failure to do so by the Pentagon officials in charge of SDI propaganda.¹⁹

After launching this campaign, Washington informed the allies that the SDI research was only a "precaution" against a USSR "breakthrough." The expectation was that it would be difficult for the allies to object to a "precaution."

Military-strategic arguments have also been cited. Addressing the Senate in March 1984, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy F. Ikle tried to calm Western Europe by saying: "Our European allies were much more certain of the reliability of American guarantees when...we were less vulnerable...than now, when we have no defensive systems and we are much more vulnerable."²⁰ Ikle prefers not to mention the fact that in the 1950's, the period to which he was referring, the United States had a nuclear advantage over the USSR, a nuclear superiority which no longer exists. He also fails to mention another fact. If Washington should develop an antimissile system, the Soviet Union will take the necessary measures, as the Soviet leadership has repeatedly stated, to preclude American superiority. The revival of American superiority will not take place. Only a qualitative increase in arsenals will take place.

Finally, people in Washington repeatedly allege--as, for example, C. Weinberger did in his widely publicized speech in Munich on 10 February 1985--that the ABM system the United States is working on will supposedly "also shield Western Europe." The Pentagon chief deliberately misled his audience

at least three times. In the first place, the SDI-related research is in such an early stage that it is impossible to say whether the projected system will be effective against certain weapons systems or even feasible. Secondly, it probably will not be effective against Soviet missile forces in a retaliatory strike aimed at Western Europe due to their short flight time and their different trajectory from strategic missiles. Thirdly, this system cannot be effective against all other weapon carriers intended for retaliation: bombers, cruise missiles, etc.

When remonstrations do not help, threats are made. In July 1984 the same F. Ikle publicly stated that Western Europe's criticism of the "initiative" would evoke a negative reaction in "American public opinion, which will conclude that the allies are helping to increase the vulnerability of the United States."²¹

A Congressional Research Service report, based largely on interviews with West European leaders, said that some of them frankly asserted that members of the Reagan Administration were pressuring their governments to stop the criticism of the SDI.²²

A key element of the American campaign to "sell" the SDI to Western Europe was the U.S. promise to distribute part of the research contracts there and give the West Europeans access to the latest technology. Washington tried to appeal directly to the military-industrial complexes of its partners. Washington emissaries have almost taken up permanent residence in the headquarters of West European corporations producing the latest military equipment. One of them, retired General R. Richardson, informed English industrialists that Europe "could take part in the production" of almost 500 satellites needed for the implementation of the SDI.²³

The promises of SDI propagandists to enlist the cooperation of West Europeans in the production of the latest weapons are not worth much. But the projected profit figures are colossal and there is the great fear of being left out of the newest fields of technical development and of a new technological breakthrough that might, they hope, be of some use in civilian production as well. In combination, these factors are motivating part of the West European bourgeoisie and its government allies to support Washington. It would be very difficult, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl said, expressing these feelings, "to remain aloof from such a technologically and economically important process."²⁴

Washington is pressuring the capitals but it is also bypassing them and appealing directly to corporations in the West European states. By enlisting the services of some specialists and awarding negligible subcontracts to companies in Western Europe, it is striving to gain access to European technical achievements and organize "brainstorming" sessions, but also to present the West European governments with the fait accompli of SDI "cooperation."²⁵

Washington's proposals are being discussed in the West European capitals. In the United States, however, these promises are regarded as a joke. "How can the administration keep its promise to allow its NATO partners to take part in SDI research without losing important secrets and jobs Congress prefers to keep at home?" THE WASHINGTON POST asked.²⁶

The experience in U.S. "cooperation" with Western Europe in weapons production, in which the latter has received the crumbs at best, and the Washington measures of recent years to impede the transfer of the latest technology, even non-military, to the allies testify that the hopes of the West European capitals are probably built on sand. Firms in their countries will not gain access to genuinely advanced technology.

Tactical Missile Defense

Plans to deploy so-called tactical missile defense (TMD) systems, intended to intercept Soviet operational and tactical missiles and intermediate-range missiles, in Europe occupy a special place in the strategy of surmounting West European resistance. With the aid of these systems, Washington hopes to kill two birds with one stone: to maximize the combat capabilities of its armed forces in Western Europe and of the combined NATO forces. At the very least, it hopes to gain the allies' consent to the deployment of these systems on their territory, "bind them" with this agreement and deprive them of any chance to object to the plans for the ABM system on U.S. territory.

It is also counting on using Western Europe as a "skeleton key" to break into the framework set up by the ABM Treaty and facilitate Washington's renunciation of it. Besides this, since the Pentagon intends to develop the tactical systems in the foreseeable future, Western Europe is being assigned the role of a testing-ground--both military-technical and political--for components of the system. The allies are supposed to consent to the deployment of the TMD and, consequently, to the subversion of the ABM Treaty within the next few years.

During hearings on the military budget in the Senate Committee on the Armed Services on 13 May 1984, Director F. Miller of a Pentagon department testified that the United States is planning the "intermediate" deployment of the TMD system in Europe before the development of "ballistic missile defense" (BMD) for U.S. territory.²⁷ The desirability of deploying the TMD in Western Europe was also mentioned in a report by a Pentagon research group headed by P. Hoffman, which was supposed to draw up a plan for the implementation of the "Star Wars" concept. "The deployment of a tactical missile defense system is an intermediate solution which could be carried out relatively quickly," the report says. "The inclusion of this plan in our long-range missile defense R & D program should alleviate the allies' fears that our greater emphasis on ballistic missile defense could mean the weakening of our determination to defend Western Europe."²⁸

In this way, with the talk about the TMD, the Pentagon was able to create the illusion that the United States plans to defend Western Europe. If the system planned by Washington is ever developed, it will cover not cities in Western Europe, but military installations, primarily American ones, on the European continent.

And here we are approaching an understanding of the role Washington assigns the TMD system in its military plans. It was inserted in them several years ago. The first news of this was reported in 1980, soon after Washington and its allies decided to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in

Western Europe. During the next hearings on the U.S. military budget, Assistant Secretary of Defense J. Wade announced that the Pentagon was considering a number of measures to lessen the vulnerability of the new IRBM's, including a tactical defense system.²⁹

Wade's statement did not attract any attention at that time, but it divulged the plans to supplement the race for offensive nuclear weapons in Europe with a race for "defensive" weapons, as well as the plans to use the former. The intention to establish a system of defense against IRBM's would be difficult to interpret as anything other than evidence that the Pentagon hoped to use the new missiles for the "measured" or "controlled" exchange of nuclear strikes. One of the propagandists of this system, D. Yost, said that this combination would be needed for "intra-conflict deterrence."³⁰ In American terminology, this means the "deterrence" of a retaliatory strike during a nuclear war, intended to secure so-called "controlled escalation" and end the war on terms benefiting its initiator--that is, a "victory." In this way, the emphasis was placed on delivering a strike with part of the new missiles and forward based systems and keeping the rest of American nuclear potential in Europe, making it less vulnerable to a retaliatory strike. Plans called for the creation of a separate "strategic reserve" to fight a "limited" nuclear war, which would "deter" a Soviet retaliatory strike. This would have created an additional layer of "padding," which would, at least in theory, inhibit the spread of a conflict beginning in Europe to the territory of the United States.

It is obvious that all of these plans were built on sand. The Soviet Union, as its leadership has repeatedly announced, rejects the concept of "limited" nuclear war and refuses to play according to the Pentagon's adventuristic rules.

The development of TMD would be a dangerous and destabilizing move. After all, it could reinforce the illusions of those in Washington who are counting on the "limitation" of nuclear war to Europe to make the threat of war more credible. This has even been acknowledged by American experts. The same D. Yost said that "the defense of the new intermediate-range systems could be regarded as a way of erecting a strictly 'Eurostrategic' level of potential conflict.... With a view to the doubts of West Europeans, many suspect the United States establishing conditions for successful warfare in Europe with the aim of limiting it to this region."³¹

The West Europeans are still being told that the Pershing II and cruise missiles are needed to "coordinate" the military-political situation in Europe with U.S. strategic potential. In fact, however, steps are constantly being taken to separate America from a military conflict on the European continent, thereby giving it maximum freedom to threaten the start of a conflict.

But the plans to impose the TMD system on the NATO countries are not only intended to enhance the combat effectiveness of deployed first-strike missiles. They are connected with the new NATO doctrine worked out in the United States and adopted by the bloc in 1982-1984, a doctrine known as the "Rogers Plan" or the "deep echeloned strike."

This concept is known to have been adapted for Western Europe as the concept of "air-land battle," adopted by the U.S. Army in 1982 in its new manual. It emphasizes massive preventive strikes throughout enemy defenses with the latest non-nuclear weapons and with nuclear and chemical weapons.³²

American documents testify that the TMD systems are viewed as a possible way of defending these weapons. The expectation is that if these aggressive weapons are made less vulnerable, they can be used more flexibly and their combat effectiveness will be enhanced.³³

Contracts for the development of new non-nuclear TMD systems for use against Soviet missiles in the European theater of military operations were signed back in 1981. In April 1984 there were reports that Pentagon contractors had designed some kind of "joint tactical missile defense" for Europe on the basis of modernized Patriot and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. The former would be used to intercept Soviet ballistic missiles and the latter would intercept cruise missiles. An impressive sum was allocated for their development--92.3 million dollars in fiscal year 1985.³⁴

A material-organizational foundation is also being laid for the American plans. In December 1983 U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner reached an agreement, and signed a contract for a total sum of 2.9 billion dollars on 12 July 1984, on the purchase of 12 Patriot air defense systems by Bonn from the United States and the acquisition of another 12 systems for free. Besides this, by the terms of the agreement, the Bundeswehr was supposed to take charge of the maintenance of another 12 systems belonging to the United States. It appears that a similar agreement was concluded with Holland.³⁵ Since 1985 the possibility of using so-called "electromagnetic guns" (electromagnetic mass accelerators) and land-based lasers for tactical missile defense has also been considered.

Therefore, in the Pentagon's opinion, everything is ready for the development of the TMD system and its deployment in Europe.

The appropriate propaganda campaign has been launched. The appropriate systems are being developed. A decision has been made on the deployment of an air defense system in Western Europe, which could be "updated" (as in the case of the Pershing I missiles, which are now being replaced with Pershing II missiles with qualitatively different characteristics) to serve as a TMD system.

There have been frequent reports in the press about some kind of EDI--a "European defense initiative."³⁶ In particular, it was championed by Bundeswehr Inspector-General B. Altenburg when he was interviewed by DER SPIEGEL magazine in the middle of February 1986. The West Europeans are being directly and indirectly encouraged to develop their own TMD systems. The political result could be the same: The West European countries will be drawn into the race for BMD systems and will be involved in joint actions with Washington to undermine the existing ABM limitation framework.

The battle between Western Europe and the United States over the White House's plans to launch an arms race in the BMD sphere is just beginning. The American administration has won some victories.

First of all, it was able to shift the focus of the discussions of the SDI in Western European ruling circles. Until the beginning of 1985, its implications were mainly discussed from the standpoint of the security interests of West European countries. This discussion centered around the question of whether they should or should not support Washington's idea. Now, however, they must answer another question--whether Western Europe should or should not participate in the SDI-related R & D program. The urgency of the matter has been understated, and the main issue is no longer the exact wording of the response to an unacceptable idea put forth by the bloc patron. The West European governments have been granted the respite they wanted. After all, their members hope that the SDI in its present form will die when Reagan leaves office and that they will be able to avoid the exacerbation of conflicts.

Secondly, Washington was able to create "fifth columns" within several West European countries. These are the military industrialists and ultra-conservatives whose hatred of the USSR makes them willing to forget the security interests of their own countries, especially the extreme right wing of the CDU/CSU.

Thirdly, the United States has been able thus far to employ the "divide-and-conquer" principle not only within individual West European countries but also between them. Chancellor H. Kohl's inclination to play into Washington's hand, especially just before the American President's trip to Bitburg in May 1985, was used to inhibit France's attempts to work out a unified (and negative) West European position on the SDI. Later, when the West German chancellor's enthusiasm had cooled slightly and when France, with the support of several other states, including the FRG, tried to coordinate the positions of West European countries on the SDI within the framework of the Western European Union, which Washington has recently regarded with increasing suspicion, a loyal ally was found--London. Great Britain announced, obviously in response to a suggestion from across the ocean, that the reply to the SDI should be drafted in NATO--that is, with the United States participating.³⁷

After this, Great Britain became the first country to record its participation in SDI-related R & D in a written agreement. London obviously hopes that it will be offered more beneficial terms of participation in order to attract the other countries.

But Washington had to be satisfied with a compromise: The allies supported the SDI research but not the idea itself. Here is how C. Bertram described the feelings in Western Europe about the prospect of an arms race in the BMD sphere: "If we disregard a few isolated voices heard from within the camp of European strategists, the West European reaction to date has been almost completely hostile.... But the European leaders, with the extremely noticeable exception of the French Government, have muffled their initial opposition to some extent, preferring to understate their differences of opinion. But this should not be interpreted as the weakening of West European objections. It is more likely the result of an increasing awareness of Reagan's commitment to this project.... The West European governments have now decided, judging by all indications, to act according to the 'time will tell' formula. They

are not objecting to the continuation of SDI research in the United States and have even expressed an interest in participating in it, but they have also declared that they consider the ABM Treaty to be an extremely important part of arms limitation and that they want it to be maintained. They have also put the burden of proof on the United States, to show that strategic defense will not separate Western Europe from America and will not undermine strategic stability."³⁸

Agreement not to contradict the senior partner does not mean agreement with its policy. "The American allies support the research in public," influential NEW YORK TIMES correspondent L. Gelb wrote, "but in private they are expressing the deepest fear that the program will lead to an arms race in space, which will weaken or completely eliminate the connection between their security and the security of the United States."³⁹

Furthermore, conflicts are so obvious and so pronounced that even the promise not to reveal them is not being kept. For example, on 20 February 1985 M. Thatcher addressed the U.S. Congress and expressed "firm support" for the SDI research.⁴⁰ On 15 March, however, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary G. Howe presented a speech, approved in advance by M. Thatcher, in which he raised so many questions about the American plans that there was no longer any doubt about London's real opinion.⁴¹

Washington was counting on the allies to support the SDI at the May summit meeting in Bonn and the June 1985 NATO session in Portugal. In Portugal, however, even the support of SDI research was impeded. The allies also refused to support the SDI at the December 1985 NATO Council session.⁴²

People in Washington have watched with alarm as the SDI became the target of public protests in Western Europe and the majority of opposition parties, especially in the FRG and Great Britain, opposed not only the very concept of "Star Wars" but also participation in the research.

The West European countries, despite Washington's initial resistance, supported the Eureka project Paris proposed for broader cooperation by the West European countries in the development of the latest technology.

It is still not clear what this project might actually become. It is also not clear whether ruling circles in Western Europe will be able to surmount their misinterpreted "Atlantic solidarity" within the near future and take a position against "Star Wars" in the national interest of their countries, or whether they will avoid confrontations with the United States by continuing to take an ambiguous position and actually playing into Washington's hand. But something else is clear. Washington's propaganda statements and "technological bait" have had only a limited impact. West Europeans are realizing that this space concept will increase the probability of war, and especially in Europe.

As a report presented at the 27th CPSU Congress noted, "the United States has already involved many allies in this program. The entire matter could become irreversible. It is essential to find a realistic solution, before it is too

late, TO GUARANTEE THAT THE ARMS RACE WILL NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO SPACE. The use of the 'Star Wars' program both as a stimulus for a future arms race and as an obstacle on the road to radical disarmament must not be allowed."⁴³ The only realistic solution is provided by the Soviet proposals aimed at preventing the militarization of space and reducing nuclear stockpiles. Their aim is stronger common security, and this is also in the interest of the West European countries.

FOOTNOTES

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4. DEFENCE, June 1984, p 349; A. Carton, "The Implications of BMD for the French Nuclear Deterrent: French Reactions to President Reagan's SDI," Wash., 1985, p 2.
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9. Ibid., p 18.
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12. S. Hoffmann, "The U.S. and Western Europe: Wait and Worry," FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1984, 1985, vol 63, No 3, p 639.
13. Quoted by P. Gallis et al, Op. cit., p 32.
14. "Political and Military Issues in the Atlantic Alliance. Hearings... House of Representatives. August 1, October 1, 1984," Wash., 1984, p 16.

15. P. Gallis et al, Op. cit., Appendix A, pp 74, 75.
16. NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS, November 1984, p 18.
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22. Ibid.
23. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 13 August 1984, p 169.
24. THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 March 1985.
25. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 April 1985.
26. THE WASHINGTON POST, 12 February 1985.
27. "Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1985," p 2979.
28. STRATEGIC REVIEW, Summer 1984, p 51.
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35. "Developments in Europe. June 1984. Hearings...House of Representatives," Wash., 1984, p 83.
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41. THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 March 1985.
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JOURNAL'S CHIEF EDITOR ASSESSES MOOD OF AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 53-66

[Article by V. M. Berezhev: "America in Early 1986"]

[Text] It was the last week of my lecture tour in the United States, but there were still several speeches and meetings to come. To be on time for a gathering at Dartmouth, where a lecture was scheduled for 19:30 as part of the "After the Summit Meeting" seminar organized by the Dickey Foundation and the Nelson Rockefeller Center, I had to take the first plane out of Portland (Oregon), leaving for Boston at 7:00 in the morning. The 3-hour time difference between the west and east coasts shortened my day by that amount. Besides this, when I changed planes in Salt Lake City, my connecting flight was almost an hour late and I began to worry about being late. Up to this time I had been lucky. During my month in the United States I had made 12 flights, crossing the continent 4 times, and I had always stayed on schedule, even though planes are often delayed in winter, and sometimes flights are cancelled. I was tempted to give the credit for this to the organizational talents of my old friend, retired Admiral G. La Rocque, the director of the Washington Center for Defense Information, who had invited me to present the lectures in the United States. Center researcher David Johnson had drawn up an extensive and detailed itinerary covering 11 cities and many scientific establishments, universities, colleges and boards of large banks. All I had to do was stick to the itinerary, but it sometimes seemed too full: 16 lectures in large auditoriums, 15 seminars and discussion groups, 6 interviews and press conferences, not to mention working lunches and receptions. What an example of capitalist exploitation! Or perhaps of American efficiency?

In any case, I had no cause for regrets. The many meetings and conversations with representatives of the most diverse groups and public organizations, with young students, with cultural figures, with businessmen and with journalists gave me a rare opportunity to learn American views in a relatively short period of time and to get a sense of the current atmosphere in America and of confrontations taking place in the United States, especially with regard to relations with the Soviet Union.

I was also lucky because I took the trip soon after the Geneva summit meeting of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan. Besides this, the Soviet proposals on the substantial

reduction and subsequent complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and the decision to extend the Soviet moratorium on underground nuclear tests for 3 months were announced on 15 January. It was exceptionally interesting to observe the reaction of Americans--both those welcoming the new Soviet initiative and those who did not care for it but did not openly admit this, seeking indirect ways of nullifying the great impression this new evidence of the Soviet power's love of peace had made on the American public....

In case my plane should be late, my Dartmouth colleagues had a reserve plan: They booked a flight on the local Precision Airlines, served by twin-engine 10-seater planes which take 20 minutes to get to the miniature airport at the top of the mountain towering above Dartmouth College. But I did not have to take this plane, almost a toy, until my return flight. Now the chauffeur of a rented limousine was waiting for me in Boston Airport. I knew him by the sign inscribed with my name he held above his head. After two and a half hours of driving along the snow-covered mountainous roads of New Hampshire, we reached our destination, pulling up in front of the big Dartmouth College auditorium. A sign by the door--"After the Summit Meeting. Three Views"--announced my lecture and was subtitled "The View from the Soviet Union." Former U.S. President G. Ford had presented a lecture, "The View from the United States," 2 days before me. Later a Swiss political scientist was to present "The View from Europe." The lecture hall, laid out like an amphitheater, seated 600 and was packed. Many people were sitting on the steps and in the aisles.

The Atmosphere After Geneva

During my tour of the United States I was struck by the tremendous public interest in the results of the Geneva summit, in the prospects for Soviet-American relations and in the Soviet Union in general. It is indicative that lecture series and seminars everywhere were connected in some way with this subject matter. In Portland, where a series of lectures had been organized under the heading "The Decisive Year--1986," many speeches touched upon U.S.-USSR relations; in Norwich, Vermont, political gatherings are held as part of the "U.S.-USSR: Bridges to Peace" project; an anthology on the history of Siberia has been published at the University of Oregon and a work on the diplomacy of Peter I is being compiled. In Palo Alto, California, a public organization, "After the Wars Are Over," regularly conducts seminars on Soviet-American relations. In San Francisco, Werner Erhard & Associates, an association which has organized exchanges with the All-Union Znaniye Society, is making preparations for several joint educational undertakings in the United States and USSR this year. The University of South Carolina organizes lectures on the Soviet Union as part of its international seminars. Discussions of relations between our countries in Washington were attended by high-level administration officials and members of Congress. Furthermore, with few exceptions, audiences were receptive and displayed a keen interest in Soviet positions and arguments. And what I found particularly striking was the desire expressed everywhere to learn more about the internal state of affairs in the USSR, about the recent changes in our country, about the widespread debates on all spheres of the life and activities of Soviet people--economics, politics and culture--and about the national preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress.

Of course, it would be wrong to think that relations with the Soviet Union are the main concern of the American public. People in the United States have many domestic problems and concerns, and the Americans are extremely egocentric in general. It would be just as wrong to assume that Americans have rid themselves of their anti-Soviet stereotypes. Even the most friendly audiences make the conventional remarks about "violations" of human rights in the USSR and ask the traditional questions about Afghanistan, Angola, Poland and even the events of long ago in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and all with an obvious anti-Soviet undercurrent. But there is no question that they are more interested in us and want first-hand information about the policies of the USSR and the life of the Soviet people. The very fact that the leaders of the two powers had attended a summit meeting and had signed a joint statement on the impermissibility of nuclear and conventional wars between our countries had a perceptible effect on the atmosphere in the United States. The fact that an anticommunist like R. Reagan had talked face to face with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev for 5 hours--much longer than originally planned--was interpreted by many Americans as proof of the possibility of reaching agreements with the USSR. The exchange of New Year's messages also made a great impression. It appears that all of this has made communism, which was used for so long to frighten the American people, look "respectable" to them. But these are the precise changes in public opinion that are making the opponents of the normalization of Soviet-American relations nervous.

Those who do not want any kind of agreements with the Soviet Union, and there are many in the current administration, were obviously alarmed by the increase in public interest in the Soviet Union. This is the reason for the new wave of attacks on the USSR in the upper echelon of government, the attempts to revive the image of the Soviet Union as the "enemy" and the speculation on the so-called "Soviet threat."

The mass media offer a slightly more varied picture. On the one hand, many informative articles about the Soviet Union are being printed in major national newspapers such as THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST and others to satisfy the public interest. Soviet subject matter is more frequently present in television programs and reports from the USSR are broadcast regularly. In addition to this, the press is also involved in the deliberate campaign to denigrate the Soviet Union and the socialist order and distort Soviet policy. In addition to the well-known anti-Soviet movies and TV films "Rocky IV," "Rambo" and "Red Dawn," another malignant film, "White Nights," has now reached the screen, and the ABC television corporation is working on a mini-series called "Amerika," a slanderous depiction of the "horrors" of the Soviet occupation of the United States. Viewers are again to be told the old lie that the USSR is the enemy and is preparing to invade the United States and turn them into slaves. Any observer of these efforts of extreme reactionary elements will naturally assume that this entire concentrated attack on the socialist order has been launched specifically for the purpose of quickly stamping out the sprouts of sympathy for the USSR that started growing in American souls after the Geneva summit meeting.

The projected "Amerika" mini-series filled many Americans with indignation. The Soviet side also pointed out the fact that slanderous programs of this

kind will do nothing to promote the "new beginning" in Soviet-American relations President Reagan referred to when he summed up the results of the Geneva talks. The ABC executives stopped the shooting of the series. Loud objections, however, were immediately heard from Washington. Secretary of Education William Bennett stated that the halting of production "smacked of Soviet censorship. Irrespective of the merits of this show," the secretary went on, "every American will be happy if ABC makes its own decision on this matter." Giving in to this pressure, the TV corporation announced the resumption of work on the 12-hour series.

This entire series of events was the topic of discussion when I met a group of officials from the Republican administration and ideologists close to it. There were 10 of them at a dinner in an elite club in Georgetown, a fashionable neighborhood in Washington. At first, all the proprieties were observed, we exchanged compliments, but soon the conversation became more pointed. My companions began to accuse the Soviet Union of all the deadly sins and blame it for the tension in the world and the state of confrontation in Soviet-American relations. During this tirade, they made references to the American public, which, they said, sees the Soviet Union as a "threat." And the Republican administration, they informed me, cannot ignore the mood of the public and is therefore having trouble establishing good relations with Moscow. If, I was told, the Soviet side were to revise its domestic policy and change its "behavior" in general, then the "menacing image" of the Soviet Union in the American mind would change for the better and the U.S. Government could begin normalizing relations with the USSR.

I had to explain our position on all of these matters in detail, although it was clear that there was not much point in doing this in my present company. My opponents were so certain that they were right that no arguments could have swayed them. I think I had happened upon the most conservative and least realistic members of the administration. Only people who have lost all perspective can seriously expect the "unconditional surrender" of the USSR. After all, the Soviet Union has never lost a war or even a battle to the United States, and I reminded them of this.

I did not want to start a fight by making counteraccusations, but I still had to say a few words about the surveillance of dissidents within the United States, the chronic unemployment, the millions of homeless Americans, the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, the organization of the counterrevolutionary coup in Chile, the attempts to overthrow the Cuban Government and the invasion of little Grenada. I directed their attention to the unique contribution the United States has made to diplomatic practice by arming and encouraging reactionary gangs hoping to overthrow governments with which the United States maintains official diplomatic relations (as in Angola, Afghanistan and Nicaragua). What kind of image does the United States create with this kind of behavior in the minds of other nationalities, including the Soviets? But we are not demanding that Washington change its domestic and foreign practices and are not setting this as a condition for the normalization of USSR-U.S. relations. We believe that we should accept each other as we are and search for ways to reach agreements and cooperate in the face of the danger of nuclear war.

Obviously, there was no reason to expect my companions to display a positive approach. Preserving the "enemy image" is their sworn duty, justifying their obstructionist position and substantiating their belief that it is impossible to deal with the Soviet Union and that Moscow "cannot be trusted," and it is therefore a waste of time and effort to negotiate agreements. It is interesting, however, that they justified their convictions with the mood of the American people, whom, according to their assurances, they serve and whose opinions they must consider. But how are these opinions formed? After all, they are the result of official rhetoric and the mass media. If the public is constantly told for years that the Soviet Union and the socialist community are the "evil empire" and if people are constantly fed malicious concoctions like "Rocky IV" and "Rambo," the image of the enemy will naturally be planted in the American mind.

I asked my dinner companions in the Georgetown club if they thought that the "Amerika" series was a deliberate attempt to frighten Americans with the Soviet "threat." Did they not think that TV films of this kind do nothing to promote the creation of an atmosphere favoring the development of the "new beginning" in Soviet-American relations their President discussed? Why does the administration not advise ABC to refrain from shooting "Amerika"?

In answer to this, they asserted in unison that the administration cannot interfere with the plans of television companies, that this kind of interference would be tantamount to government censorship and would be unconstitutional.

"Why then did Secretary of Education Bennett take the liberty to criticize the broadcasting company for its plan to stop the shooting?"

"This is a completely different matter. The secretary was only objecting to the Soviet side's attempts to censor the ABC production."

"But what would you say if a Soviet TV program depicted the American occupation of the USSR and the Soviet people's struggle against the occupation?"

"We would not think anything of it. After all, you show movies about the German occupation."

"But Hitler's Germany did occupy huge regions in our country. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has never been at war with the United States and does not plan to. How could anyone even think of making a TV program about the Soviet occupation of America? This is malicious slander, another attempt to slander the Soviet Union and foster distrust and suspicion for the purpose of complicating the normalization of our relations. I am certain that after this movie has been shown, you will again start saying that the American public does not trust the Soviet Union."

"We have nothing to do with it," they replied. "This is ABC's business. Apparently, its executives believe that this kind of film will appeal to Americans...."

There was no point in continuing the discussion. As for the public appeal of the movie, I will cite a letter from reader Sarah Epstein to the editor of THE WASHINGTON POST:

"I was depressed after I read the item 'Green Light for ABC's "Amerika,"' in THE WASHINGTON POST on 23 January 1986, which said that the television company had decided to continue working on the 12-hour mini-series about the United States under Soviet occupation. I can understand why the Soviet side objects to this. At a time when we can only hope that our country and the USSR are striving to reduce nuclear weapons and revive cultural exchange, this kind of program, intended to brand the Soviets as invaders and occupants of our country, will only increase the fears of some Americans and reinforce the 'image of the enemy'....

"It would be better for our mass media, our reporters, our press and Americans in general to be more concerned about positive steps in the direction of mutual understanding and less concerned about 'who retreated,' 'who won' and who has been branded as the enemy.

"Our planet is fragile and subject to many kinds of pressure. The only thing that will save us is the great powers' realization that all of us are here together on a small spaceship and their display of some willingness to cooperate. Television in our country has so much influence. I wish it could be more conscientious."

This letter is extremely indicative. Nevertheless, it is a fact that many Americans are still trapped by the anti-Soviet cliches they have been fed.

The Responsibility of the Press

The issue of "conscientiousness" or, more precisely, of the responsibility of the mass media warrants special discussion. Lively debates are now going on in the American press, as I already said, reflecting the interest of large segments of the American public in the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In essence, the debates revolve around the question of whether the United States should conclude agreements with the Soviet Union. Feelings about the USSR are part of this. If people believe the old cliches that the Soviet Union "cannot be trusted," the USSR does not fulfill its commitments, it represents a "threat" to America and it is "aggressive" by its very nature, if people feel that all of America's problems are caused by the USSR, then it is senseless to conclude agreements with it because this, according to this line of reasoning, weakens the U.S. will to build up weapons and achieve superiority, but this is needed to "force" the USSR into agreements. This is the line of reasoning of the most influential members of the Republican administration. We see this in the U.S. administration's response to the Soviet proposals of 15 January and in its demands for an increase in the new U.S. military budget, to strengthen the position of the American delegation in Geneva in the "bargaining" with the USSR.

The other line of reasoning is that the time has come for a more sober look at the current situation, and especially for a more accurate view of the

Soviet Union, its real intentions and its domestic and foreign policies, the time has come to admit that the USSR does not have to be "forced" into serious agreements and that Moscow is really striving for equitable agreements. An article by famous diplomat and scholar George Kennan, published in the 29 December 1985 issues of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, is indicative. In it Kennan refers to his other article that stirred up so much controversy when it was printed in 1947 by FOREIGN AFFAIRS and signed "X." This was the first time the term "deterrence" was used in reference to the Soviet Union. Now Kennan--for the hundredth time!--explains that he was misunderstood then, that he was not referring to military, but only political-ideological, "deterrence" and that the USSR "did not pose a military threat" to the United States. After the terrible ordeals of the war, the Russian people "needed and wanted peace," Kennan recalls, and it was therefore completely senseless to assume that the USSR was capable of committing aggressive acts. Furthermore, Kennan goes on to say, at that time the Soviet Union "had not even tested a nuclear weapon," whereas the United States already had atomic bombs. Under these conditions, the USSR certainly did not pose a military threat, Kennan declares. He also explains that socialist ideas were becoming quite popular in Europe and Asia as a result of the defeat of fascism, the determination and heroism of the Soviet people and the strength of the Soviet system. For this reason, Kennan felt that it was the United States' duty to "deter" the spread of socialist ideas and social changes to different parts of the world.

Turning to the current situation, Kennan says that what has to be done today consists less in "deterring" the Soviet Union than in "deterring" the arms race, which threatens all humanity. As for American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, Kennan advises "a more profound and intelligent view of this country than the one embodied in our public rhetoric. Furthermore, we must admit that many of the causes of our problems lie outside the bounds of the Soviet challenge, whatever it might be, and some of these problems could be of our own making."

Kennan's article aroused great interest in politically active groups in the United States. It was mentioned in almost all of my conversations with Americans. Many saw this as an indication of an attempt by part of the ruling elite to find a new approach to Soviet-American relations. Others associated it with the debates and battles now taking place in the upper echelon of the Republican administration. Some of the people I talked to asserted that even the President himself, after meeting the Soviet leader in Geneva, was inclined to think that the only way he could go down in history as a "peacemaker"--which is, according to some sources, the fondest dream of the master of the White House--was to establish good relations with the Soviet Union and conclude an agreement on nuclear disarmament. It is as if he has reached a fork in the road: On one side there is the temptation to be remembered as a "great president" and there are the sober recommendations of his more moderate colleagues--this is why he expressed "gratitude" to the Soviet side for putting forth its disarmament proposals of 15 January and why he spoke of a "new beginning" in American-Soviet relations. On the other side there is the pressure of those who avoid any agreement with the Soviet Union, who are taking advantage of the anticommunist prejudices firmly entrenched in the President's mind. The result of this was the repetition of the hackneyed cliches about the Soviet "threat" and "expansion" in the President's recent speeches.

We can assume that it was not a coincidence that Kennan decided to publish his views now, after the Geneva summit, at a time when future relations with the Soviet Union are being hotly debated in the United States. In any case, he provided the supporters of the normalization of relations and the cessation of the arms race with new arguments. On the other hand, his article startled the extreme Right. It appears that even the editors of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES were worried about being branded as "liberals" after the publication of Kennan's article. In subsequent issues of the newspaper, they systematically printed letters from readers who had been "outraged" by the sedition of G. Kennan, who had dared to tell Americans that many of the difficulties the United States is experiencing could "be of their own making"--that is, could be a result of Washington policy and of unrealistic approaches to the most vital issues of the present day. The authors of these letters were particularly exasperated by Kennan's statement that the USSR was more of an ideological threat than a military one to the United States and that Americans should apply the "deterrence" formula to themselves. It was for this that Kennan was rudely attacked by a certain J. Sayoles in a letter printed in the newspaper on 12 January 1986. Several other letters in the same vein were printed in the same issue of the paper. The author of one, Mark Wiley, tried to refute Kennan's conclusions by asserting that everything the USSR does is bad and everything the United States does is good. "Our defense interests," Wiley categorically declared, "extend beyond our own borders and naturally include the mineral resources of South Africa, the oil in the Middle East and important trade routes, such as the Suez and Panama canals." Kennan's hint that these globalist tendencies should be "deterred" was fiercely attacked by the author of this letter. For making this kind of statement, the world-renowned scholar and diplomat deserves, in Wiley's opinion, to "be punched in the nose by every decent American." In conclusion, M. Wiley states, with the self-assurance of the ignoramus: "We must resist Soviet imperialism and strive to overthrow it. Otherwise we will eventually become its slaves. If George Kennan is so stupid that he cannot understand this obvious fact, he should at least have the decency to refrain from forcing his false and misleading views on all of us."

What convincing arguments! Anyone who dares to share views objectionable to idiots and anticommunists should be "punched in the nose" and told to shut up. And it is highly probable that people like Wiley foam at the mouth when they defend American "freedom of speech"!

It goes without saying that each person is entitled to his own opinion, even the most outrageous. But the fact that a newspaper as solid as THE LOS ANGELES TIMES felt the need to print letters of this kind in more than one issue is a different matter. In essence, what we see here is the newspaper's willingness to force the "ideas" of M. Wiley and his ilk on its hundreds of thousands of readers. This should make us wonder whether THE LOS ANGELES TIMES also sympathizes with these "ideas."

This is the question I asked four editors of the newspaper, who received me in their head office in the center of Los Angeles.

"We print the letters we receive," I was told.

"As far as I could see, you print an average of four letters in each issue. Yesterday all of them were pointedly hostile toward the Soviet Union. Is it possible that the editors received only these four letters?"

"Naturally we receive many more, hundreds or even thousands."

"You mean there is a selection process?"

"That is absolutely right."

"But according to what principle? Would it have been impossible to select at least one letter with more favorable remarks about the Soviet Union and print it along with the three hostile ones? Then there would be at least some measure of objectivity."

"What for? We choose and print what our readers like. We must satisfy the wishes of the public. We see this as our duty."

I must admit that in spite of my many years of acquaintance with the morality of the American press, I was somewhat surprised by this answer. I asked them if the newspaper staff did not feel that now, especially after the summit meeting, all of us should feel some sense of responsibility for the future of our nations, for the prevention of confrontations that might lead to nuclear catastrophe. When an editor in the Soviet Union has to decide whether to print certain articles, he judges their ability to create a more favorable atmosphere in the interest of better Soviet-American relations. After all, we all want the normalization of these relations, don't we? Did the people at the paper agree that this primarily requires ridding Americans of biased views of the Soviet Union?

In response, I heard remarks to the effect that the job of the press is to present the facts, and not to educate the reading public; as if the systematic publication of anti-Soviet items did not "educate" readers to feel hostile toward the USSR. They went on to explain that the winners in the fierce competition in the mass media are the ones who give the public what it wants. People, they said, are used to reading mainly bad things about the Soviet Union. And this is what they expect.

But it is possible that someone gave some thought to the responsibility of the mass media for the future of the world, some thought to the role the press could play in establishing more favorable conditions for better relations between our countries and reaching important agreements, especially in the sphere of disarmament. It is interesting that 10 days later, when I was already in South Carolina, I received a letter from California with a clipping from the 22 January issue of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES. It was a letter from reader Robert McKennon in response to Mark Wiley's "ideas."

"It is regrettable," he wrote, "that Wiley and many other Americans have decided to ignore the colossal human suffering that is the result of our government's intention to impose its will on other governments and other people. Obviously, Wiley has decided that the atrocities in the Vietnam War

did not happen. Unfortunately, too many of us still have vivid recollections of the little children consumed by the flames of napalm dropped by American planes and of the My Lai massacre. Apparently, he also prefers to believe that we had nothing to do with the overthrow of the duly elected governments in Chile and Guatemala, which cost thousands of innocent people their lives; or perhaps he justifies all of this by saying that everything we did was for their own good.... And now we are supporting a gang of cutthroats and mercenaries, many of whom spent most of their lives serving Anastasio Somoza by terrorizing the people of Nicaragua to uphold his brutal and corrupt dictatorship. Now we are supplying them with weapons so that they will be better at the only thing they know how to do: terrorize and kill. We even supply them with textbooks so that they can do these things in the most efficient way.... If we really want to put an end to international terrorism, we should begin by admitting our part in it."

Although this letter probably did not appeal to the readers who like the other kind of statement, the editors of THE LOS ANGELES TIMES printed it anyway, and they must be given credit for this.

The Reaction to the Soviet Proposals

The Soviet proposals on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons were announced when I was in San Francisco. A reception was to be held that evening in the home of a person I knew to greet the cosmonauts from the USSR and GDR who had come to California for a meeting with American astronauts. The reception was attended by members of the academic community, politicians, public spokesmen, publishers and actors. But the main topic of discussion was not the meeting of the cosmonauts and astronauts, but the content of the new Soviet proposals, which had been printed that morning in all of the major U.S. newspapers and were mentioned throughout the day on the leading American TV networks.

Most of the people I spoke with agreed that the new Soviet initiatives had caught the Reagan Administration by surprise and kept it from making its latest contribution to the arguments that were just starting over the Soviet Government's previous proposals, put forth at the talks in Geneva.

The idea of ridding humanity of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was so bold and extraordinary that it staggered the imagination of Americans. Especially since they cannot reconcile themselves to the vulnerability of the United States in the nuclear age. They are beginning to understand that only the elimination of nuclear weapons will make them truly secure again. It was precisely these feelings the supporters of "Star Wars" were speculating on when they created the illusion that U.S. territory could be covered reliably by a space antimissile umbrella. The public was promised that this would make nuclear weapons "obsolete and powerless" and that they could then be eliminated. But people know that all of this is dubious, and that even if everything should happen just as the authors of the SDI have promised, it will only be in the very distant future. But now the Soviet Union is proposing the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of this century, naming a specific date, and one close enough to give many the real prospect of living in a nuclear-free world.

The Soviet proposal is extremely appealing. In my meetings with Americans, especially student lecture audiences, I was invariably asked to discuss it in greater detail, and I could sense that the prospect afforded by the Soviet proposals seemed especially tempting to young people.

After the meeting with the cosmonauts, I had dinner with an old friend, an influential American businessman. He suggested a popular restaurant which had recently been opened in a huge hall that had been a showroom for American cars just a short time ago. When Japanese competition threatened to make the showroom operate at a loss, its owners quickly converted it. Of course, they were guided by the profit motive, but turning an unprofitable showroom into a flourishing establishment is another example of rational American thinking. The restaurant was packed, but my companion had wisely reserved a table. The design of the hall was extremely original: with special lighting effects and inflated figures of people and animals soaring high overhead. The patrons were served by efficient young men and women, most of them students earning a little money in their spare time. Incidentally, what brings the public into this restaurant is not only its extraordinary decor and attentive service, but also its excellent and varied cuisine.

The hostess led us to a small table. This is another characteristic feature of the majority of American restaurants. Tables are usually for two. If a large group arrives, the tables are put together for four, six, eight patrons and so forth. But a young couple or two friends who want to have an intimate conversation will always find a small table. No one will bother them and no one will be seated next to them. Lighting is subdued, candles in colored glasses stand on the tables, the music, as always in the restaurants here, is quiet, and it is possible to have a quiet conversation.

My businessman friend immediately returned to the subject of the Soviet proposals. He thinks they are quite timely and convincing.

"The main thing," he said, "is that they responded to several questions and some deliberately planted suspicions with which the opponents of agreements tried to distract the public from the crux of the matter. Above all, there is the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the near future. In the past, whenever the Soviet side declared its final goal to be a world without weapons, people in the West rejected the idea as a fantasy. Now things are different. After all, in essence even President Reagan proposes to eliminate nuclear weapons after the creation of the antimissile shield envisaged in his Strategic Defense Initiative. Consequently, the American side can no longer call the Soviet proposal a 'fantasy.' Furthermore, this proposal has an obvious advantage because it schedules the elimination of nuclear weapons not for some time in the vague and distant future, but within the lifetime of today's middle and younger generations, and, what is more, without wasting hundreds of billions of dollars on a dubious antimissile umbrella project. If the United States rejects this proposal now, it will look to the entire world as if it supports the nuclear arms race."

The second point my friend brought up was the issue of intermediate-range weapons.

"Soviet proposals on weapons of this type," he explained, "have recently been discredited with the remark that when Moscow proposes the elimination of Soviet and American nuclear missiles capable of reaching one another's territory, it is hoping for the elimination of the American Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe but expects to keep its own SS-20's, which will not reach America. Now the matter has been stated in precise terms: It applies to American and to Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The French and English nuclear forces are another important factor. The new Soviet proposals also make important clarifications here, nullifying the main objections of the Western side. Finally, there are the Soviet proposals regarding the reduction of conventional weapons in the future. This is an extremely important aspect because the opponents of agreements have already expressed doubts and fueled fears by making references to the superiority of the USSR in conventional arms. The remark Mikhail Gorbachev made at the press conference in Geneva, that the Soviet Union is just as interested in the security of the United States as in its own, is particularly important in this connection. And it is true that in our nuclear age, security cannot be guaranteed by the lack of security on the other side...."

I had seen American audiences react with exceptional interest to this idea, reflecting the new nature of international relations in our time. I was often asked to repeat or explain it. The idea apparently sounded extraordinary and even incredible. It is difficult for many to believe that the USSR, which they are used to seeing as the "enemy," can really care about the security of the United States.

My dinner companion stressed that the Soviet Union's extension of its moratorium on underground nuclear tests was also quite timely. He believes that the Republican administration was able to distract the public by inviting Soviet observers to attend American underground tests. Official propaganda concentrated on the USSR's negative response to this proposal, and the mass media convinced the average American that the Soviet Union did not try to reach a compromise with the United States in this area. As a result, many Americans simply forgot about the unilateral Soviet decision to stop underground nuclear tests. The decision to extend the Soviet moratorium for another 3 months and the repeated invitation to Washington to join the USSR in this move forced the American press to return to this topic and duly inform the public of the Soviet position.

"Now," my friend said in summation, "the supporters of the tests will have to reveal the real reasons for the refusal."

It did not take long. The very next day Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger announced that the United States had to continue the tests as long as nuclear weapons existed. It was soon learned that this was also the official position of the Reagan Administration. The U.S. Government's continuation of underground nuclear tests for the creation of new lethal systems is clearly inconsistent with Reagan's declared aim of eliminating nuclear weapons.

The "Challenger" Disaster and "Star Wars"

The new Soviet proposals gave additional momentum to the U.S. debates on the plans to militarize space. There are more and more reports in the press

about the negative opinions of prominent American and West European scientists, pointing out the danger of these plans.

According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the majority of scientists feel that the weakest link in the projected system is the impossibility of developing reliable computers to secure the effectiveness of the SDI. In a letter addressed to this newspaper, Professor Anthony Ralston declared: "I do not know a single expert in the computer field who would express the slightest optimism about the possibility of developing this kind of equipment. Since this is how matters stand with regard to the most important part of the SDI system, all Americans should be seriously worried."

The paper printed this letter on 16 January, and soon afterward America and the rest of the world were shocked by the "Challenger" tragedy.

It was a gloomy morning in Portland. From the 19th floor of the Hilton, I could barely see the wet roofs of neighboring buildings through the fog. Soon it would be 7 and I did not want to miss the news. I turned on the television set. There is a time differences of 3 hours between here and the east coast, and the program began with a report from Florida, where a much-postponed shuttle lift-off was supposed to take place on Cape Canaveral. There were seven astronauts on the screen, including two women. One was Sharon Christa McAuliffe, a teacher who was going into orbit for the first time to teach a class from there. They entered a small room where a table was set for breakfast. All of them were dressed in T-shirts and looked happy and energetic. Then the seven, now dressed in light-blue jumpsuits, boarded a small van and took off for the launch pad. The camera focused on the "Challenger" spaceship, attached to the huge cylinders of its booster tanks. We saw the ice-covered casing of the spaceship, from which long icicles hung. The announcer said that the exceptionally severe frost and the ice cover had initially raised doubts about the possibility of the lift-off, but the specialists had decided that this was not a problem.

The seven were back on the screen. They were wearing space-suits. These were their last minutes on earth, they said their goodbyes to ground personnel, waved, and then the elevator closed behind the astronauts. The camera then focused on the crowds that had gathered to watch the latest shuttle lift-off. The camera panned the crowd and then showed a close-up of the faces of Sharon Christa McAuliffe's parents and sister. They were smiling and had their arms around each other.... The launch pad was on the screen. The end of the countdown was heard: four, three, two, one, and lift off! Red tongues of flame shot up from below. The "Challenger" slowly picked up speed, as if it did not want to leave the ground, and then shot into the air. The camera stayed focused on it and the announcer even had time to say that everything was proceeding normally. Suddenly, in the 75th second, the screen was filled with a white and orange ball with some kind of fantastic free design. At first I thought that something had gone wrong with the TV set. But then the agitated voice of the announcer could be heard: "Something terrible has happened to the 'Challenger,' and we can only hope that the astronauts did not suffer...." The clock said 11:38 Florida time. Quoting the heads of NASA, the announcer reported that the explosion followed a seemingly faultless lift-off. According to the controllers who monitored the flight on computers,

"there were no signs of any irregularity on the screens. The explosion was a surprise, there was absolutely no distress signal."

But the next day the newspapers were already reporting that a careful study of the videotape in slow motion showed that a tongue of flame appeared on the booster casing a fraction of a second before the explosion. This immediately made people wonder why the computers did not react to this and why the controllers had seen nothing on their monitors.

Americans like to fly their national flag. It is always flying not only over official buildings, but also over stores, hotels, private homes and gas stations. On this day all of the flags were at half-mast. The Americans were paying their last respects to the dead space heroes. The city was still, it was in mourning.

In the evening there was a public lecture in a large auditorium in Portland. When Professor Joseph Ha introduced me, he spoke of the importance of a Soviet-American agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. He mentioned the colossal threat the nuclear stockpiles pose to humanity.

"We cannot be certain that a fatal accident or a lethal explosion will not take place someday. It seems to us that everything is under control, but this is how we felt about the shuttle. In the 56 times Americans flew into space, there were never any problems during lift-off. And today no one suspected a problem. But a terrible unexpected catastrophe took place. We must all think about how long humanity can live under the nuclear Damoclean sword."

On this evening the Americans were particularly interested in the details of the Soviet proposals. Many asked questions and many expressed the hope that the USSR and United States would reach an agreement on the vital issue of disarmament.

After the "Challenger" tragedy, the arguments in the United States about the "Star Wars" plans were even more heated. More and more Americans are beginning to realize that the militarization of space with reliance on "failsafe" American technology is a dangerous myth. Besides this, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the American side's reluctance to give up these plans is putting the entire disarmament process in question.

In conversations with members of various segments of the American public, I repeatedly asked why the idea of the SDI was nevertheless winning considerable support in the United States. In Bank of America headquarters in San Francisco, I was given this answer:

"Few businessmen believe in the feasibility of the SDI. There are also widespread worries that the illusions connected with it could undermine U.S. security and heighten the probability of a nuclear conflict. But many corporations supported the Star Wars project for a simple reason: The administration generously finances research, and firms participating in it can use the results to improve various products without spending their own money."

This is another interesting explanation of the motives of monopolies: They are willing to support dangerous ventures for the sake of their own selfish interests.

I had two more meetings to attend before leaving Washington. One was in the Brookings Institution, a professional discussion with my American colleague of the complex problems of the present day and the prospects for Soviet-American relations, and another was in the Kennan Institute. The crowd was the usual group of students, politicians, including senators, diplomats and journalists. My speech on how we view the current state of USSR-U.S. relations was followed by lively discussion. Most of the questions were about the new Soviet proposals and the reaction to them in the United States and about the domestic situation in the USSR. There was also some stereotyped criticism of the Soviet Union and allegations of violations of human rights in our country. In my response to these remarks, I had to list the basic human rights included in our understanding of the term: the right to work, to free medical care, to affordable housing and to free education. I also mentioned the right of Soviet citizens, and of guests in our country, to freely walk the streets of our cities without worrying about being robbed or killed--that is, a right which the people in Washington lost long ago. They now stay locked up in their own homes.

Lunch was then served in the Kennan Institute. The man sitting next to me, a renowned academic, made a remark in passing:

"It was good that you mentioned the crime in Washington. The situation has become more acute in the last few years. I live in Georgetown, in an extremely wealthy neighborhood. Just recently we could take a walk in the evening. Now it is too dangerous. If my wife and I have to walk somewhere, we phone all the neighbors to find out if anyone else is planning to go out, so that we can be part of a big group. Otherwise, it is too much of a risk...."

The capital of the United States has changed considerably in just over 2 years. The dilapidated buildings around Pennsylvania Avenue have been removed, old buildings in disrepair have been remodeled and there are many new buildings, with glittering golden glass walls. There are pretty squares with sidewalk cafes. New and comfortable subway lines have been added. But all signs of life disappear by evening. People are afraid to be on the streets. The capital of the richest capitalist country in the world is surrounded by ugly decaying slums where poverty and injustice have been perpetuated, where young people have no hope of getting a good job and where desperation and hunger push many into crime....

These facts remind us again of the acute domestic problems the American government has been ignoring for decades. But after all, even a negligible portion of the funds wasted on the arms race would be enough to alleviate the injustices and flaws of the American society, make the life of the underprivileged much easier and reduce the appalling poverty accompanying the glitter and incredible wealth of present-day America.

My many meetings with members of various strata of the American society and my discussions in seminars and in student lecture halls gave me some sense

of the mood of America in early 1986. There was a keener interest in international issues, especially the issue of disarmament, and in the prospects for American-Soviet relations, there was a mounting desire for first-hand information about the life of the Soviet people and the policy of the USSR, and there were the beginnings of doubts about the "image of the enemy" painted by reactionary propaganda. Americans are spending more time thinking about how the threat of nuclear war can be averted and how lasting peace can be achieved.

A look at the realities of American life provides a clearer understanding of how important it is for Americans and us to know each other better, and for our countries to achieve a certain degree of trust and acknowledge that it is not only possible, but also necessary, to live in peace and mutual understanding. All of us are now especially enthusiastic about a statement made at the 27th CPSU Congress: "The Soviet Union firmly intends to justify the hopes of the people of our two countries and the entire world, who expect the leaders of the USSR and the United States to take concrete steps and actions and conclude realistic agreements to curb the arms race. We are ready to do this."

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CSO: 1803/08

U.S. POSITION IN PHILIPPINES, ROLE IN ELECTION CRITIQUED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 67-74

[Article by V. P. Lukov: "United States-Philippines: Fire in the Ocean"]

[Text] The stormy events in the Philippines this February riveted the attention of the world public on this country, on American-Philippine relations and, in the broader context, on Reagan Administration policy in the Pacific.

For most of the "post-Vietnam period," there has been an undercurrent of satisfaction, often bordering on smugness, in official and near-official reports on U.S. Pacific policy. After removing the "Vietnam splinter" and moving its armed forces from the Asian continent to the Pacific islands, Washington began a lengthy politico-psychological operation intended to erase its military and political defeat in the Asian Pacific from its own memory and from the memory of the world public.

Washington's line of reasoning was the following: The defeat in Vietnam was an isolated, local and uncharacteristic event, resulting less from objective circumstances than from the mistakes, inconsistency and indecision of the Johnson Administration. In general, the situation for the United States in the Asian Pacific was not only satisfactory but even extremely favorable. As the Vietnam catastrophe receded into the past, this line gathered strength, was filled with new nuances and acquired an increasingly euphoric nature.

It must be said that the arguments put forth by the apologists for this line seemed extremely convincing to many. What were these arguments?

First of all, they said that the central element of American military strength in the region--the Japanese-American military alliance--had grown stronger and more effective and that Japan's military strength had increased.

Secondly, they asserted that American-Chinese relations had changed in the United States' favor to such a degree that they could be described as "unofficial strategic cooperation."

Thirdly, they stated that the situation in the region as a whole had been stabilized on a favorable level for the United States.

This third point warrants more detailed discussion. It is true that considerable economic progress was observed in several developing states and territories of the Asian Pacific in the 1970's and early 1980's. This was precisely the time of the energetic rush to establish export-oriented economic structures in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. In American political and economic circles this was viewed as a second edition of the "Japanese economic miracle" and as evidence of the creation of another zone, in addition to Western Europe, of developed capitalism, on which the United States could confidently rely, in the Pacific zone.

The successes of the last decade in the economic development and political convergence of the six ASEAN states (in addition to Singapore, there are the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei) were termed the "third wave" of stabilization in the United States. People in Washington ascertained with pleasure that this association, which had quite recently been an extremely amorphous group of states with basically the same type of economy and therefore had presented a difficult subject for integration processes, nevertheless did not collapse under the weight of the many centrifugal tendencies of an objective and subjective nature, but even strengthened its economic and political ties. And the members of this association are extremely large developing countries, with human potential numbering 300 million. The states occupy an important strategic position. In view of the fact that two of the six countries (the Philippines and Thailand) have legally recorded military connections with the United States, people in Washington believed that ASEAN would be the ideal connecting link between the United States and the "moderate" developing countries, serving as a channel for the spread of American economic and political influence to them. The success of this plan necessitated the transformation of at least the key countries, which naturally included the Philippines, a former American colony and an object of special U.S. concern and patronage, into a showcase of the American pattern of development.

For several years, many American politicians and economists were convinced that this strategy was developing successfully: The rates of economic growth in the majority of ASEAN countries were much higher than indicators for the developing world as a whole, and the level of political stability (meaning the continuity and viability of the rightwing conservative political regimes in the majority of ASEAN countries) was completely satisfactory to Washington. The result of this assessment of the situation in the region was the constant repetition of the statement that the wind in Southeast Asia was filling American sails.

This statement was made quite frequently after the exacerbation of the situation in Cambodia at the end of the 1970's. The expulsion of Pol Pot's forces with the aid of the SRV armed forces, interpreted by Washington and pro-American forces in the region as "Vietnamese intervention," complicated the political situation there and led to more vigorous attempts to divide the region and consolidate anti-Vietnamese, antisocialist forces. There was a definite rightward shift in ASEAN, and Washington found itself in the center of a heterogeneous coalition demanding the revision of the results of the political evolution of the Indochinese peninsula in the 1970's and early 1980's.

For some time, short-term political considerations outweighed the severe and long-standing economic conflicts between the leader of the imperialist world and the group of developing countries in the region.

Recently, however, spurts of caution, and even of obvious anxiety, have been heard in the stream of euphoric statements about the situation in the Asian Pacific.

These new feelings apply to virtually all of the main spheres, which were so recently the basis and source of satisfaction and self-confidence. As for American-Japanese relations, feelings close to panic gave rise to an uncontrollable increase in the deficit in the U.S. balance of trade. It was not so long ago that then President R. Nixon called the U.S. deficit in trade with Japan, which had reached 4 billion dollars by the middle of the 1970's, a catastrophe. Now, however, the deficit is approaching 50 billion dollars, and this, even with a view to 15 years of inflation, is a completely different matter. Therefore, in the first half of the 1980's the indisputably strong centripetal forces characteristic of American-Japanese relations began to undergo serious tests of strength.

After the 12th CCP Congress (September 1982), American assessments of the prospects for relations with the PRC became more ambiguous, especially with regard to the use of the "China factor" in Washington's strategic (both global and regional) plans. The official statements by the PRC leadership about the pursuit of an independent and autonomous foreign policy line and the renunciation of strategic cooperation with anyone whatsoever were given various interpretations in the American political community, but no one interpreted them as a foreign policy victory for Washington.

Finally, Washington has been alarmed by the increasing apparent signs of deteriorating economic conditions in a region that was just recently an "exemplary model." Furthermore, the signs of crisis have been clearest in precisely the countries that were held up in the past as examples of successful development "according to the American-Japanese model." The most severe economic crisis shook Singapore, where economic indicators suffered a 5-percent drop in the past year, and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced for the first time in 20 years that "warnings must be issued." The situation is not much better in other countries: Exports are declining, capital investment is decreasing and economic growth indicators, which ranged from 8 to 12 percent a year for a long time, have dropped to 0-4 percent. Furthermore, all of this happened at a time when the energy situation for countries poor in energy resources improved as a result of declining world oil prices. Consequently, this is a matter of severe and crucial problems with deep domestic and foreign economic, structural and social roots. Malaysia and Thailand have recently been stricken by acute domestic political conflicts.

The Philippine earthquake developed in this atmosphere of fluctuation.

The Republic of the Philippines has always been of special importance to the United States in this region. It is its former colony, a product of its political and legal exercises, and, in a certain sense, its Galatea. In

discussions of the Philippines, the rhetoric of American political officials, which already sounds to the outsider as if it were burdened by excessive moralistic pathos, acquires the tone of the ancient tragedies.

When President W. McKinley sent delegates to the Paris peace conference in 1898 soon after the United States had taken the Philippines away from the decrepit Spanish crown, he gave them these instructions: "America took up arms against Spain in the performance of high social and moral duties." The American Congress was then discussing the Philippines in baser terms. Senator A. Beveridge from Indiana, for example, made the following remark to justify the joint congressional resolution establishing permanent U.S. sovereignty over the Philippines: "The Philippines are ours forever.... Beyond the Philippines lie the boundless markets of China. We will not refuse them either.... We will not miss any opportunities in the Orient.... The Pacific Ocean is our ocean.... The Philippines will be our gateway to the Orient."

When these remarks were made, morals were simpler and emotions were displayed openly. These were the days that today's American conservatives are holding up as an example to the present generation. In essence, however, we can confidently say that there has been no change in the code of American behavior toward the Philippines.

The age of colonialism is over. People in the United States love to recall how Washington defended the principle of decolonization after World War II in arguments with its main ally-rivals, Great Britain and France, and do not like to recall their own colonial past. In the American official political jargon of today, the Philippines became a sovereign state and an equal and independent friend and partner in 1946.

The events of recent months, however, have pushed today's jargon into the background and have revealed the essence of American-Philippine relations, showing that this essence was changed little by the change of political scenery.

The Philippines were in a state of acute economic, social and political crisis. The analysis of the causes and nature of this crisis and the determination of whether it evolved into a revolutionary situation are subjects for separate research and do not fall within the bounds of this report. For our purposes, it is important to note that a country which was connected to the United States (if not bound to it) more than any other Pacific country was in a difficult, even desperate, position. The economic crisis (the gross domestic product of the Philippines decreased by 10 percent over the last 2 years and "reached" the 1972 level in constant prices), the double-digit inflation, the 40-percent unemployment rate, the 26 billion dollar national debt, the corruption in the highest levels of government, so blatant that it is precisely in reference to this country that the term "thieves' capitalism" is most often used, the poverty of the lower strata, the shameless exploitation of these strata by local and foreign (primarily American) capitalists, and one of the highest crime rates in the world were all a result of the pattern of development sponsored by Washington.

The rebel movement, which had moved back and forth from the jungles of remote islands to the central island of Luzon, approaching Manila, the capital of the country, throughout the postwar period, became active again. According to American and official Philippine data, rebels in 60 of the 74 provinces now control from 5 to 20 percent of the territory.

Sensing the mounting urgency of the situation, Washington political strategists, burdened by agonizing memories of the aftermath of the "Iranian procrastination," began to seek an alternative to President Marcos' regime in the early 1980's. This alternative would have to defuse the domestic political situation but would leave the main thing unchanged.

The main thing for Washington in the Philippines is the bases. In 1947, a year after Washington granted its largest colony the status of an independent state, it convinced the Philippines to allow the Pentagon the use of a site for the construction of two large military bases for 99 years. In 1959 the Philippines achieved the slight relaxation of the terms of the treaty: The time period was reduced to 25 years and was to be reviewed every 5 years. During the negotiations in 1979, President Marcos demanded 7.5 billion dollars in "rent" for the use of the bases. The sides eventually agreed to the introduction of some attributes of formal Philippine sovereignty (the raising of the Philippine flag over the bases, etc.) plus the payment of 900 million dollars by Washington over the next 5 years.

The main "particulars" of the U.S. bases in the Philippines are the following: The largest U.S. naval base in the West Pacific, Subic Bay, and one of the largest air force bases, Clark Field, together perform two-thirds of the functions involved in the support of the operations of the American Seventh Fleet in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The naval ammunition and supply depot on Subic Bay is the largest outside the United States and is intended to serve all types of ships and planes of the Seventh Fleet, including strategic missile carrying submarines. The shipyards cover 65 percent of all the Seventh Fleet's repair needs. There is a storage facility on the base for 2.4 million barrels of fuel.

An average of 75 American military ships, including aircraft carriers, sail into Subic Bay each month. Planes from aircraft carriers in drydock are on the Cubi Point Air Force Base near Subic Bay. This is also the post of the American C-3 Orion antisubmarine planes that patrol shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean.

Clark Field is located 43 miles from Subic Bay. This is the largest military airport in the West Pacific, capable of performing 12,000 air operations a day. The all-weather facility, capable of accommodating any plane, including the strategic B-52 bomber and the C-135 tanker plane, serves to shelter the American 13th Air Division. In accordance with the Pentagon's strategic plans, Clark Field is equipped to participate in military operations anywhere from Korea to the Middle East. This is understandable: For example, 15 cargo planes located on this base could deliver 3,500 tons of cargo in a day to the base on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The bases have a maintenance staff of 18,000, and the Filipinos who work there earn approximately one-seventh of the amount paid to Americans performing similar operations.

This far from complete list of features is probably the best indication of the United States' real interests in its former colony.

In 1979, after many years of negotiations, the United States made the above-mentioned concessions but reserved the right to use the two bases at least until 1991. It is true that the negotiated agreement contains a statement about "complete respect for Philippine sovereignty" over the bases. This statement, however, is balanced by another, in which the "unimpeded routine management" of base operations by the United States is stipulated. This actually means that the American armed forces could do anything they wanted within these bases flying the Philippine flag after the negotiated amount had been paid.

The possibility of losing the Philippine bases is an extremely upsetting one for American strategic experts. They allege that this would leave such a gap in the American system of "forward defense" that it would be extremely difficult to repair it. Washington has already started taking measures "in case the worst should happen." Since 1976 the United States has been persistently and consistently "rounding out" its Pacific possessions by including various parts of Micronesia within its empire. This first happened to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and then to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Belau (Palau). It was there that the Pentagon began establishing duplicate naval and air complexes. This is considered to be an inferior duplicate, however, because even the part of Micronesia which is farthest from the United States and closest to the Asian continent, the islands of Belau, is approximately 1,600 kilometers from the Philippines. In other words, in the strategic context, there is no substitute for the Philippine enclave of the American military machine in the Pacific. (The bases are "simply irreplaceable," the authors of a report issued by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded.)

And this means that "friendship" with the Philippines is needed at any cost. Therefore, work began in the Washington political labyrinths to create a pro-American alternative to the Marcos regime, which was showing signs of decay and instability.

At the beginning of the 1980's, energetic Senator Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino, who had been living in exile in the United States after spending more than 7 years in prison in the Philippines, was seen as a "promising leader" in Washington. His attempt to return to his homeland on 21 August 1983, however, ended tragically: B. Aquino was assassinated in the airport as soon as he stepped off the plane. According to the official story, the senator was killed by a "communist partisan," whose corpse was discovered next to Aquino's body. The opposition accused the Marcos government and the armed forces of murder. The unrest in the country increased dramatically; mass demonstrations became a common sight. Rebel activity also increased.

Under these conditions, under strong pressure from the United States, F. Marcos announced that presidential elections would be held on 7 February 1986. The opposition's presidential candidate was C. Aquino, the widow of the assassinated senator. The campaign began in an atmosphere strained to the utmost.

We can confidently say that the parallel fight over the best U.S. position in this confusing situation was equally strained. As is usually the case in these situations (for example, in Iran or Nicaragua), one faction of the American political elite advised "support for Marcos to the end" to avoid precipitating a process of political changes virtually impossible to keep under strict control. Another insisted on wholehearted support for the opposition bourgeois faction in the hope that it would have a soothing effect on public emotions and would deprive the rebel movement of a mass base. The main argument in favor of the first line was that C. Aquino had taken a position on the bases that was not entirely acceptable to Washington, stating that she would tolerate them on Philippine territory only until 1991, at which time the agreement could be revised. The argument in favor of the second option was the personal popularity of C. Aquino, connected with the natural sympathy for a widow avenging her dead husband, and the desire at the last minute to separate the United States from a regime with an extremely bad reputation, a regime which was rapidly losing the support of even the Philippine business community.

The line of opposition support prevailed. This took the form of a well-organized wave of moral indignation in connection with the possibility of election fraud. One American group after another went to the Philippines to observe the elections (including the group headed by Senator R. Lugar, appointed on the President's own recommendation).

In the feverish atmosphere of mounting moralistic passions, no one wondered why Washington had completely approved of the Marcos regime for 20 years and was then filled with righteous indignation on the eve of the decisive elections. After all, many recall that when Vice-President G. Bush visited Manila in 1981, he told Marcos: "We value your loyalty to democratic principles and the democratic process." And the next year the President himself greeted Marcos with open arms in the White House. How could American politicians, with their far from spotless reputation (President Nixon's serious conflicts with the law, as well as those of Vice-President Agnew, Secretary of Labor Donovan in the Reagan Administration and others, provide ample proof of this) assume the moral right to judge the integrity of politicians in another country? Or, finally, how could Washington think it had the right to send inspectors to verify and evaluate domestic political processes in a sovereign country, even a former colony? Does this mean that the same rights are accorded to, for example, Holland in relations with Indonesia or England in relations with India? Or is all of this merely the habitually presumptuous behavior of a strong power, hidden behind a loud outburst of moral indignation?

The elections on 7 February did not put an end to the Philippine problems or the American doubts and hesitation. Both Marcos and Aquino announced that they had won. The official vote tallying agency announced that Marcos had been elected, and the unofficial National Citizens Movement for Free Elections gave the victory to Aquino. In the atmosphere of confusion and mounting critical tension, Washington decided to openly and resolutely take center stage as the "leader of the parade." After realizing the futility of retaining American influence in the Philippines with the Marcos government in power, the United States decided to overthrow him without delay. White House envoy

P. Habib rushed to Manila and, within a few days, had held intense "consultations" with around a hundred military and civilian officials. The consultations came to an end on 21 February and Habib left to report to Reagan. On 22 February Defense Minister J. P. Enrile and Chief of General Staff F. Ramos occupied the Ministry of National Defense building with military units loyal to them, announced their break with Marcos from there and demanded his resignation. On 24 February Marcos telephoned Senator P. Laxalt and asked the American President's personal friend to allow him to "share power" with the opposition. After consulting with the President, Laxalt reported his "opinion" to Marcos: "It would not be practical for Marcos to share power with Aquino, and it would be undignified for him to stay in the Philippines." For emphasis, the American ambassador to the Philippines repeated Reagan's statement to Marcos in person. Meanwhile, the troops in Manila were taking the side of the rebel generals.

Marcos "took Reagan's advice" the next day: An American helicopter took the now ex-president and his companions to the American Clark Base, from which they were taken to the American island of Guam 8 hours later. The operation of the "democratic transfer of power in a sovereign state according to the will of the people" had been completed. P. Habib rushed back to the Philippines to offer "advice" on the formation of the new government.

Hindsight lends clarity to some enigmatic comments the American President made immediately after the elections of 7 February: "The American public has riveted its attention on the elections in the Philippines. Sometimes we have to remind ourselves that these are Philippine, and not American, elections." Apparently, the reminders never did penetrate the heavy armor of forgetfulness. In any case, this was the opinion of THE NEW YORK TIMES, which commented: "Never before has the United States acted so openly in removing the head of an important allied country. After Washington lost faith in Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam and the shah of Iran, it took part in organizing their departure from their countries, but it did this much more covertly."

Therefore, Washington won a round in the neocolonial "battle for the Philippines." The change of faces in the government will temporarily quell emotions and cover up the urgent social implications of real problems. But these problems still exist. First of all, no one knows how strong and how "controllable" the new political regime in the Philippines is, because it represents a conglomerate of diverse currents of political opposition to Marcos and the military leaders who denounced him at the very last minute. Secondly, it is not clear what should be done about the critical economic situation in the country. Thirdly, there are already arguments about how the rebel movement should be stopped now that it is of sizeable dimensions and has a sound organizational base.

The results of this round were quite objectively summed up by THE WASHINGTON POST: "When Marcos fled the country, he left behind a contradictory and dangerous legacy to the Philippines and to the American politicians who first made him an Asian leader and ally and then turned their backs on him when the price of supporting his government was too high.... Marcos left behind a

devastated economy and a demoralized army. The Aquino government's degree of progress in solving these problems will have a considerable effect on American interests in the Pacific zone."

Therefore, the flames have been smothered, but the fire has not been put out. The situation is still complex in the Philippines. This country is still the main source of anxiety for the United States in the Asian Pacific. The main one, but certainly not the only one. It is already obvious that the U.S. hopes for a lengthy period of calm and "controlled stability" in the Pacific zone were illusory.

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COMMISSION ON HISTORY OF CULTURE OF U.S., CANADA SET UP

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 96-97

[Article by O. E. Tuganova: "Where Fields of Science Meet"]

[Text] The culture of the New World is being studied by Soviet researchers on a broad scale. But our philosophers, historians, sociologists, psychologists, experts on literature and art and representatives of other special fields rarely unite their efforts or compare their research findings. This should be promoted by the recently established Commission on the History of the U.S. and Canadian Cultures, set up as part of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on the History of World Culture. It will invite specialists, scientists and practitioners from all fields to take part in cooperative projects and will welcome the suggestions of interested individuals and establishments with regard to the subject matter and organization of joint research projects.

Important tasks lie ahead for the commission. It is important to answer the main questions, determine the nature and categorize the features of American culture as a single entity, as a completed cultural-historical phenomenon (attention is now being focused on the United States, but the Canadian culture will also be examined in the future). All of this can be accomplished only if specialists from various fields of knowledge derive joint conclusions from their separate research projects.

Of course, it will be important to determine the place and role of the individual in American society and beliefs about the individual's connection with nature and space (primarily in the philosophical context, but now also in the direct sense of the term). The preferable type of individual and preferable models of society must be determined. The society's beliefs about the desirable directions of its development and self-assessment of this development will require analysis. It will be important to demonstrate the diversity of lifestyles and values (connected directly with the social-class structure). It would also be useful to describe such cultural characteristics as the society's degree of changeability and flexibility and, at the same time, its invariability and petrification, the degree of its interest in new and unprecedented experiments combined with its inherent adherence to tradition. The sociohistorical concept of American individualism also requires more thorough and complete study: not the predatory or purely capitalist individualism, but the individualism that motivates the search for new methods, initiative, ingenuity and has long been combined with the ideal of human solidarity.

Of course, a precise classification of historical periods in the development of the U.S. culture will also be needed. Soviet researchers have not studied cultural geography to date, but this science is closely related to studies of the national mentality, way of life and contradictory image of Americans. The U.S. culture's interaction with cultures of other countries and regions has not been studied adequately: Much is written about the expansion of the U.S. bourgeois "mass culture," but the matter is certainly not confined to this! It is clear that the list of topics of joint research could be continued.

The new commission's first major undertaking was the "roundtable" it organized to discuss the interaction of the U.S. and USSR cultures in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. The gathering was held in 1985 and was indisputably influenced by the general atmosphere of the year marking the 40th anniversary of the great victory over fascism. The speakers were unanimous in the opinion that close cooperation with American specialists in the study of the culture of the New World would be extremely desirable in the future. That gathering, however, was attended only by scientists from Moscow, Leningrad, Gorkiy, Perm, Tyumen and Leninakan. They reported on fundamentally important events in the history of Soviet-American cultural interaction.

After World War II the fierce military-technical competition between the two states began to affect their relationship, and the wishes of U.S. ruling circles to establish the "Pax Americana" and attain world leadership had an adverse effect. Nevertheless, cultural interaction and contacts continued to be developed in various spheres, demonstrating their tenacity. Speakers at the roundtable noted that American views of the Soviet Union had undergone some regression in the first half of the 1980's but were nevertheless much more complex and diverse than they were 30 years ago. The USSR's successes in space exploration and in other fields forced Americans to assess the Soviet society's creative potential realistically. Motives for cultural interaction, including scientific and technical cooperation, have been mutual and have been important to both sides. Furthermore, Western Europe frequently played and is still playing the role of a mediator or connecting link in the cultural interaction of our two powers.

Many speakers discussed the problem of understanding the values of a dissimilar, "alien" culture (referring to its historical experience, national character, traditions and ideological and political realities). Two points of view were expressed. The prevailing idea in some reports was that cultural interaction can have distinctive features even on a fairly narrow scale. Speakers said, for example, that our directors sometimes do not understand the artistic distinctions of American playwrights using different styles and stage performances based on some kind of "average" American play. Besides this, speakers naturally discussed the sometimes deliberate misinformation in U.S. interpretations of our culture, the interruptions in cultural interaction and the artificial restrictions imposed on it by ideological and political considerations.

The other point of view was that cultural interaction should be regarded as the mutual acquisition of vitally important motives for such contacts, sometimes direct and sometimes moving "backwards" and resulting from the clarification of negative experiences. The impact of this mutual influence is

measured by the degree of assimilation of progressive and humanitarian principles. Those who are constantly wary of a false interpretation of "alien" cultural values might remain outside general cultural processes, in a state of far from splendid isolation, and lose many fundamentally important motives for personal development, which sometimes produce results only over the long range.

The new edition of the CPSU Program says: "The CPSU supports the extensive mutual exchange of real cultural values among all countries. This kind of exchange should serve humanitarian goals: the spiritual enrichment of people and the consolidation of peace and good-neighbor relations." Soviet-American contacts are of special importance in this context.

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AMERICAN BOOK ON SDI, INTENDED FOR LAYMAN, REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 111-113

[Review by M. A. Knyazkov of book "Star Wars and the State of Our Souls" by Patricia Mische, Minneapolis, Winston Press, 1985]

[Text] Patricia Mische, a journalist and public spokesperson, is famous in the United States as one of the founders of the Association for Global Education, established to explain the most acute political problems to broad strata of the American public. Mische has also written several monographs and serious scientific articles. The most famous is her book "Toward a Human World Order," in which the author cogently advocates the comprehensive development of cooperation between nations.

As speakers stressed at a recent conference on security issues in Cambridge (Massachusetts), this kind of book has been needed for a long time. Daniel Ellsberg, once an employee of the RAND Corporation, a Pentagon think tank, and now an active member of the peace movement, commented that the White House had been able to derive certain propaganda advantages from its announcement of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) by alleging that the "anti-nuclear shield" would make nuclear weapons "powerless," and therefore unnecessary. In this way, Reagan cleverly took advantage of the widespread desire of common Americans to eliminate the nuclear threat. This was also acknowledged by Executive Director Jane Grunebaum of the National Campaign for a Nuclear Freeze. In the United States, she said, there is a lack of awareness that the policy of President Reagan "could mean a new and dangerous round of the arms race."

Mische's new book is specifically intended to help average Americans understand how dangerous the "Star Wars" program could be for them and for international peace in general.

In a chapter entitled "The Weapons of the ASAT and Star Wars Programs. A Description and Appraisal," The author analyzes exactly what space weapons can do and what the consequences of their production and deployment might be. Here she divides all space weapons into antisatellite and antimissile weapons. "The supporters of these weapons," Mische writes, "assert that they are intended exclusively for defense, that they are supposed to save human lives

and prevent nuclear war." The author logically refutes these statements by the apologists for the arms race.

In particular, she criticizes the White House's stepped-up tests of the ASAT system. "Many satellites," Mische says, "have a strategic military purpose. They are intended to secure the early warning of a missile attack, help to verify the fulfillment of arms control agreements by the two sides, guarantee urgent communications between military leaders and the armed forces under their command and keep an eye on the military activities of foreign states. For this reason, military satellites are regarded as an essential element, needed for the prevention of surprise attacks and the maintenance of stability. The development of antisatellite weapons, however, will undermine the nation's confidence in its ability to detect and deter an attack. A nation having anti-satellite weapons and planning to deliver a first strike could start by attacking the opponent's satellites to put his early warning system out of commission."

The author devotes considerable attention to the exposure of the myths spread by the Reagan Administration, that its stepped-up antisatellite weapons program is supposedly only a response to the "actions of the Soviet Union" and is intended to "deter the USSR." According to her data, the United States already had a land-based antisatellite system, consisting of missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. "The United States already had an operable antisatellite system in 1963-1975," Mische specifically notes. In this connection, she warns that further work on antisatellite weapons by Washington will only lead to a new round of the arms race. "Current U.S. policy seems to be based on the naive assumption that the Soviet Union will sit by idly and will not make any effort to create its own ASAT system to counteract the American one."

Mische believes that the "Star Wars" program will also escalate the arms race because even if the American antisatellite system is capable, as scientists have said, of intercepting approximately 50 percent of the enemy missiles, the other side could increase its nuclear arsenal by 50 percent and thereby restore the balance. "If the United States violates the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems by deploying its Star Wars system," the author writes, "this will probably be followed by the failure to observe the offensive arms limitations negotiated in the SALT agreements, especially since the United States has never ratified the SALT II treaty."

Summing up this discussion, Mische writes: "By starting the development of space weapons, the United States could simultaneously start an arms race in space and escalate the nuclear arms race on earth. The resulting situation will be highly unstable and the danger of nuclear war will increase."

The author reveals some of the political motives by which the apologists for the militarization of space are guided. One is anti-Sovietism (the author cites a remark made by Edward Teller, the "father of the H-bomb," in November 1983, that the Star Wars program would force the Soviet Union to increase military spending); another is the desire to rule the world. For example, U.S. Under Secretary of the Air Force E. Aldridge stated: "It does not take too much imagination to see that the nation which controls outer space can control the world."

Rejecting the SDI as a destabilizing program, Mische advocates the conclusion of an effective USSR-U.S. agreement to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. The author notes that existing treaties could not foresee all new types and systems of weapons. For example, the 1967 Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which prohibits the placement of any objects carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, does not prohibit the emplacement of laser, ray and other weapons, which are intended to constitute the basis of Reagan's space "shield."

Proceeding from this, the author concludes that only an agreement on a total ban on all space weapons can reliably keep the arms race from spreading to space. "A total ban on space weapons now, before either side has developed them," the author says, "would be of benefit in guaranteeing the security of the two countries and the entire world in general. It is essential, however, that this ban extend simultaneously to antisatellite weapons and antimissile systems.... Without an ASAT ban, it will be impossible to maintain the existing ban on the testing and deployment of the antisatellite system envisaged in the Star Wars program. By the same token, the ASAT ban will not be practicable without the reinforcement of the ABM limitation treaty."

Mische believes that the prevention of an arms race in space will considerably facilitate the resolution of other problems in the sphere of arms control. "The prohibition of space weapons," she writes, "is the key to the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It is unthinkable that the United States and USSR will agree to reduce the number of their nuclear weapons without a simultaneous and effective ban on space weapons."

The author stresses that the prohibition of space weapons will also give the United States indisputable advantages. The author makes special mention of the following: The United States will save hundreds of billions of dollars which would otherwise be added to the already colossal budget deficit; it would be possible to redirect material resources for the resolution of major domestic problems--the elimination of unemployment, the improvement of environmental protection and medical services, etc.; the support of the ban on space weapons would heighten the United States' prestige in the eyes of the world public, which it has lost; the prohibition of space weapons would pave the way for the peaceful use of outer space.

Advocating the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting space weapons, Mische refutes the allegations of the Reagan Administration and ultra-rightwing groups in the United States that the USSR is supposedly "violating existing arms control agreements" and that "the conclusion of new agreements is therefore pointless." Citing remarks by various American experts and the data of various studies, the author concludes: "The reports of the Reagan Administration do not present sufficient evidence to support the allegations that the Soviet Union is not observing existing agreements."

In the final chapter of the book, "Cooperation in Space: The First Step for Mankind," Mische writes: "The accomplishment of nuclear disarmament could take decades. The first step in this direction, which we could take in the

near future, would be cooperation in space." In this connection, she proposes the organization of joint U.S.-USSR space programs and the exchange of technological information. "This kind of cooperation will be of benefit to all," the author remarks, "industry, science, education, agriculture, medicine. But the most important thing is that this kind of cooperation would aid in relaxing international tension and consolidating peace."

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THREE BOOKS ON WORLD POLITICAL, MILITARY ROLE OF OIL REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 113-116

[Review by Ye. I. Yurkov of books "Arms and Oil. U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf" by Thomas MacNaugher, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1985, XIII + 226 pages; "The United States and the Control of World Oil" by Ed Shaffer, London-Canberra, Groom Helm, 1983, 246 pages; "Canada's Oil and the American Empire" by Ed Shaffer, Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, 1983, 296 pages]

[Text] The authors of these books focus on the oil problem and on American military and political methods of solving it.

Ed Shaffer, a professor of economics at the University of Alberta (Canada), analyzes the history of the American "oil empire": the struggle of American monopolies for a dominant position in the world oil market, the period of the flourishing of this dominion and, finally, the rapid erosion of American positions in the Middle East under the influence of changes in international relations.

For many years, he writes, American foreign policy was a policy in defense of U.S. oil interests throughout the world ("Canada's Oil...", p 275). The information presented in his two books graphically demonstrates the hidden mainsprings of this policy.

The Persian Gulf is of special interest to American imperialism. Its huge oil deposits, its impressive "petrodollar" reserves and, finally, its proximity to the Soviet Union gave Washington an excuse to categorize this region as one of "vital importance" to the United States. The situation in the Persian Gulf zone, however, is extremely tense. The Iran-Iraq war, the mounting religious-nationalist feelings and the intergovernmental and inter-religious conflicts are aggravating U.S. relations with the gulf countries.

In view of the fame of the author of "Arms and Oil," a Brookings Institution researcher, and of the fact that he compiled the book with the aid of a group of equally famous experts on the Middle East, this book can be regarded as a serious attempt to advise the administration of a balanced and effective policy line in the region of the "world oil store-room." The fact that ORBIS

magazine published an abridged version of part of this book in its fall issue last year can be viewed as more evidence that MacNaugher's ideas are shared by other members of the American academic community.

What does T. MacNaugher suggest? Above all, the precise determination of long-term U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. He repeatedly stresses in this book that American politico-military plans for this region in recent years have been changed too abruptly under the influence of political and economic shifts. The author feels that the reaction was excessive in almost every case and seriously undermined U.S. positions because it created the impression of inconsistency on the part of the American leadership (p 13). In connection with this, the author advises the reassessment of American interests in the Persian Gulf and the planning of a more flexible policy, especially in the military sphere, taking all circumstances into account. MacNaugher writes: "The constant instability of the situation in the Persian Gulf will always mean risks and uncertainty for those with interests in this region. The military policy of the United States should be engineered with a view to this uncertainty" (p 16). What lies behind this terse recommendation is cautious advice to conduct a long-range policy and avoid, especially during the choice of a military strategy, the temptation to demonstrate "the greatness of America" or any express determination to rush into battle with anyone who "threatens America."

The author, expressing the feelings of part of the American establishment, including many career diplomats, tries to substantiate the idea of a more cautious foreign policy in this region. His recommendations, however, are in keeping with the feelings of some members of the U.S. military establishment, who have expressed an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the absence of precise political instructions on the use of the American military machine for the defense of U.S. interests in the developing countries.

E. Shaffer offers an extremely convincing explanation of the irrational U.S. line in relations with oil-producing states. According to the data he cites, American oil policy is influenced strongly by people representing the interests of oil monopolies ("The United States and...", pp 193-219). In particular, he mentions the Rockefeller group from the Chase Manhattan Bank, with its own representatives in high-level U.S. Government positions, regardless of which party is in power. In light of this, it is understandable, E. Shaffer writes, that the U.S. administration makes policy reversals in line with the interests of oil monopolies. Many American experts on Middle Eastern affairs believe that a policy of overt interventionism does not make sense because, as past experience has shown, the United States has failed in virtually every attempt to oppose the national liberation and democratic movement by military force.

T. MacNaugher proposes the thorough investigation of the so-called "threat" the Soviet Union allegedly poses to American interests in the Persian Gulf. The author concludes that the Soviet Union has no intention of using military force to seize or destroy the oil infrastructure of the region. "Moscow's interest in the southern flank" has never stemmed from a desire to control gulf oil, he writes. It is most probable that the Soviet Union was expressing

reasonable worries about the destabilization of the situation in the region and the buildup of American armed forces there. There is no indication, in MacNaugher's opinion, that the USSR is preparing to impose its will on this region (p 45).

This conclusion clearly contradicts the prevailing opinion in the American administration about the "expansion" of the Soviet Union and its longing for the "southern seas." This is extremely interesting!

Why does the author nevertheless favor an American military presence in the region? He asserts that diplomacy alone, unsupported by military strength, will probably be "worthless" (p 47).

"If the Soviets have no need to seize the sources of oil...", the author writes, "the United States should think about the security of its interests in the gulf in terms of ideals transcending the bounds of the mere protection of sources of oil" (p 47). He later says: "In this restless region a clear-cut role is played by instruments of security--weapons, military aid and, possibly, American armed forces--in the context of the broader U.S. policy of supporting the regimes of the peninsula" (p 87).

Therefore, this is quite simply a matter of banning national liberation movements and protecting pro-American feudal-monarchic regimes. This is precisely what E. Shaffer writes about in his book "Canada's Oil." In his opinion, the American "oil empire" could not exist without military support and without interference in the internal affairs of the countries of this region. It was precisely as a result of this kind of interference that U.S. monopolies won their struggle with the Mossadeq government in Iran in the middle of the 1950's ("Canada's Oil...", p 125). The United States was prepared for the same kind of interference at the time of the oil crisis of 1973-1974. Only the fear of undermining the stability of the ruling regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia forced the United States to agree to the sharp rise in oil prices ("The United States and...", p 108).

The current sociopolitical situation in the countries of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf proves that the real threat to U.S. interests in the gulf zone is posed primarily by the factors simultaneously threatening the monarchic regimes of this region. MacNaugher admits that the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the unresolved nature of the Palestinian question have made this region an explosive one. He feels that U.S. military plans in the region should be carefully coordinated with the domestic security of gulf states. "If the United States wants to help them (the gulf governments--Ye. Yu.) solve their security problems...it must coordinate its actions with their attempts to protect themselves" (p 126).

Analyzing the system of security established by the gulf countries in 1981, the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), MacNaugher concludes that the system is "working quite well" in general, in spite of its peculiarities and, according to many Western appraisals, irrationality (p 157). The United States, he believes, should wholeheartedly support the council with some variety of "flexible response" (p 160).

The many pages of the author's discussion of this topic can be summarized in a single paragraph: The United States should be prepared to take military action in the event of any large-scale conflict in the gulf zone that might justify the use of military force by "outside intervention." The armed forces of the gulf countries, on the other hand, should be occupied in the suppression of "internal unrest." This kind of system would be comparatively effective even if the United States should decide--at least officially--not to play an excessively noticeable role in safeguarding the security of its gulf allies and, what is most important, not to deploy its armed forces in the gulf countries on a permanent basis, MacNaugher writes (pp 160-164).

MacNaugher suggests that the American military presence be replaced by broader-scale deliveries of weapons and assistance in equipping and training local security forces. Besides this, the author recommends the organization of indirect military aid to the gulf countries through Jordan, Pakistan and, possibly, Egypt, which are already taking part in various GCC defensive measures.

The author has not forgotten the United States' partners in Western Europe either. Since the complete coordination of the actions of NATO countries in the gulf zone has been impossible to date, and since it is unlikely that future competition between the United States and Western Europe in the oil and arms markets can be avoided, the author feels that the United States should encourage its allies to take independent action in the gulf zone, to give the rulers of the GCC countries a chance to prove that their policies are "independent" of the United States and to simultaneously involve the West European countries as closely as possible in political and military intrigues in the Persian Gulf.

These are MacNaugher's recommendations for American policy in the Middle East. They contain appeals for a realistic approach, warnings about the danger of self-deception with anti-Soviet slogans, and recipes for the maximum mobilization of resources in a struggle for pro-American stability in the region. His conclusions seem quite balanced and appear to be based on extensive documented information. However, there is still the question of whether the United States will be able to retain its neocolonial position in the region with the aid of these recommendations, which are a mixture of interventionism and more cautious policy in the spirit of the "Nixon doctrine." A return to the ideas of the Canadian researcher is quite appropriate at this point. Here is what Ed Shaffer writes: "The end of the oil era is a signal of the end of the age of American dominion. The United States can never regain its lost positions. The American empire, as all past empires, will disappear forever." He arrives at the same conclusion in his book "Canada's Oil" (p 280). As for MacNaugher, he also ends his research in a minor key: It is most likely, he writes, that the significance of the Persian Gulf countries will continue to grow, and the situation there will require American policy to display the kind of "skills that have traditionally been lacking in the U.S. military and diplomatic arsenal" (p 206).

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BOOK ON USSR, FOREIGN EXPERIENCES IN NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 118-121

[Review by I. F. Antonova and A. I. Cherkasov of books "Ispolzovaniye resursov i osvoyeniye territorii zarubezhnogo severa" [Resource Use and Territorial Development in the Foreign North] by G. A. Agranat, Moscow, Nauka, 1984, 200 pages; "Sever: novyye problemy i vozmozhnosti (ratsionalnoye ispolzovaniye resursov)" [The North: New Problems and Possibilities (The Efficient Use of Resources)] by G. A. Agranat, Moscow, Znaniye, 1984, 48 pages; "Severnnyy Ledovityy i Yuzhnyy okeany" [The Arctic and Antarctic Oceans], edited by A. F. Treshnikov and S. S. Salnikov, Leningrad, Nauka, 1985, 502 pages]

[Text] Section XII of the Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and the Period up to 2000, ratified by the 27th CPSU Congress, says:

"To continue the accelerated buildup of productive potential and exploitation of natural resources in the country's eastern regions. To develop their economy comprehensively, striving for the quicker growth of branches of the production and social infrastructure. To include the more efficient northern natural resources in economic circulation." The use of the terms "eastern regions" and "northern" in the same paragraph is not an accident: After all, the vast regions of Siberia and the Far East account for the overwhelming majority of eastern regions in our country, natural zones defined in global terms as the newly assimilated northern territories of the northern hemisphere.

The increasing importance of the crude resources of northern Tyumen and all of Siberia in the development of productive forces throughout our country is underscored in this document and in the speech presented by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev at a meeting of the party and economic aktiv of Tyumen and Tomsk oblasts on 6 September 1985.

The exploitation of the rich energy, mineral and other crude resources of vast northern territories is now being stepped up not only in the USSR but also in several foreign capitalist states. There is no question that the USSR is the leader in this field in terms of the scales and range of operations, but it is extremely important to study the experience in the development of the foreign north--especially northern Canada and the United States,

with their similar natural, climatic, economic and geographic features. The study of economic and social processes in the American north (northern Canada and Alaska)--one of the last targets of contemporary capitalism's territorial expansion, where methods of capitalist economic management are being employed in virtually virgin territory--is of considerable importance to us, both from the standpoint of the possibility of using the positive experience accumulated abroad and with a view to the need to take negative experience into account and avoid repeating certain mistakes. The study of foreign experience in northern development is also important as an essential component of the general theoretical basis and strategy of developing new territories.

Research of this kind is being conducted in the USSR, and the publication of important works in 1984 and 1985, describing the process of the development of northern territories on the global scale, is a particularly noteworthy fact in this connection.

Two of them were written by an expert on the north, G. A. Agranat, a renowned authority in the USSR and abroad. The first is a basic work, wholly devoted to the analysis of the experience in northern development abroad--in Canada, the United States (in Alaska) and Greenland. The second book, which is short but extremely informative, employs an analysis of the Soviet and foreign experience in the use of northern resources as a basis for the discussion of major theoretical aspects of the development of new territories on the global, worldwide scale. The author's chief aim in both books was the elaboration of practical recommendations, which will be of value in determining the most efficient ways of developing the Soviet north in the near and more distant future.

Finally, the third book, a collective monograph in which a view of the globe from above is presented, examines the natural resources and economy of the Arctic basin, which is gradually being turned by the improvement of transportation and the development of adjacent territories into a new "Mediterranean Sea of our day," which unites, rather than divides, the three largest industrially developed powers in today's world--the USSR, United States and Canada. G. A. Agranat wrote the chapters dealing with the economy of the coastal regions of the foreign Arctic, the development of Arctic transportation and the role of the Arctic Ocean in the world economy.

In the introduction to the first of these books, the author states that it is "less a systematic description of the economy and population than a discussion of the very essence of the process of territorial exploration and development, the essence of the scientific, technical, socioeconomic, political, technical-economic and ecological trends in this process" (p 4). For the sake of accuracy, we must say that a systematic description of the economy of these territories is unquestionably present in the book, but here, in contrast to the author's previous work,* it is presented from a specifically practical point of view, with the aim of carrying out the main purpose of the work: deriving practical conclusions from the foreign experience in the organization

* G. A. Agranat, "Zarubezhnyy Sever: opyt osvoyeniya" [The Foreign North: Experience in Development], Moscow, 1970, 414 pages.

of production in the north for subsequent use in economic activity in the northern USSR. In this respect, this work is a fundamentally new study, filling one of the gaps in Soviet scientific literature on northern development.

The book is distinguished by a balanced structure, which is not at all based on the "traditional" fields of economic geography (resources, population, industry, transportation, etc.), but on the current system of "northern" priorities.

The author could have paid more attention to the exceptionally interesting (from the standpoint of the possibility of using foreign experience) topic of the management of northern economic development, which is discussed on only 4 pages in this work. The absence of a chapter on environmental protection in the foreign north is also regrettable. This is an extremely pertinent topic and one which, judging by articles in journals, G. A. Agranat has been researching extensively and productively in recent years. In our opinion, another important subject should have been examined separately--the role of the north in the national economic development of the United States and Canada and its position in the economic systems of the two countries.

In the second book the author draws the extremely important conclusion that "undeveloped remote regions whose resources and territory are still not convenient to exploit but whose environment is still unspoiled could become more valuable, from the standpoint of national wealth, than regions which were populated long ago and whose resources are being exploited intensively but whose ecological capacities are on the verge of depletion" (p 41).

This conclusion is supported by an equally important statement in the third of these books about the growing importance of not only the northern territories but also the Arctic waters around them--economic importance (the possibility of exploiting off-shore oil and gas deposits and shipping) and military-strategic importance. The accuracy of this statement was confirmed by the diplomatic conflict which broke out between the United States and Canada in August 1985 when the Americans tried to send the ice-cutter "Polar Sea" through the Arctic Northwest Passage without the consent of the Canadian Government. The United States considers these waters around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago to be international, but Canada regards them as its territorial waters, and even as loyal a U.S. ally as the Mulroney government felt the need to announce in September 1985 that measures would be taken to reinforce Canada's sovereignty over the territory and waters of the Arctic Archipelago--measures with an obvious anti-American thrust.

The author of these works, however, does not focus attention on American-Canadian conflicts in the Arctic or on "purely Canadian" or "purely American" problems arising in the process of northern development. He is interested primarily in the aspects of northern development in the capitalist states which can provide answers to global theoretical questions (Should the north be settled or should matters be confined to the short-term recruitment of manpower? Should its economy be diversified or specialized?). G. A. Agranat does not provide a categorical answer to these questions, which are being debated in the USSR and abroad, although he leans toward the first alternative

in both cases. His assessments of the results of the resolution of many specific problems in the foreign north (including such important ones as the problem of rapidly developing the infrastructure of new regions and of conducting a "protectionist" economic policy--that is, one assigning special priority to northern development) represent an important step toward final decisions on these matters.

The specific advantages of the comparatively optimal patterns of development in the Soviet north are listed in a joint statement by G. A. Agranat and A. A. Arbatov, laboratory chief at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Systemic Studies, in one of the latest issues of the CEMA publication DOSTIZHENIYA I PERSPEKTIVY.* Here the authors cite studies of U.S. and Canadian experiences and note the possibility of (and necessity for) the diversification of the economy in newly developed territories. They stress that the ecological factor can play a special role in the multisectorial development of these territories because the need for the territorial redistribution of industries is arising in the industrially "saturated" countries. In view of the fact that nature in the northern regions, with their extreme natural conditions, is quite sensitive to anthropogenic and technogenic activity, the optimal thresholds of industrial concentration and population density must be lower here.

In the opinion of these authors, the development of northern regions should be aimed at the long-range comprehensive development of all productive forces, periodic changes in specialization and the expansion of interregional cooperation. Furthermore, this development will require a special financial approach during its initial stage--the allocation of additional funds and privileges for the budding sectors of the economy in newly developed regions, which will produce a multiple return over the long range. We must agree with this substantiated opinion of the Soviet specialists, based on a comprehensive analysis of global processes of northern development.

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CSO: 1803/08

* G. A. Agranat and A. A. Arbatov, "New Trends in the Development of Industrial Mining Regions," DOSTIZHENIYA I PERSPEKTIVY, No 44, Moscow, 1984, pp 18-24.

CHARACTERISTICS, STATISTICS ON B-1 BOMBER PROVIDED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 86 (signed to press 16 Apr 86) pp 123-127

[Response by S. N. Karabanov to letter from reader M. M. Cherkasskiy: "The Strategic B-1 Bomber"]

[Text] The U.S. debates over the new American strategic B-1 bomber program have been the subject of several reports in the press. I would like to know more about this plane and about the arguments and problems connected with its development.

Respectfully,

M. M. Cherkasskiy, retired, Moscow

The first thing the reader of any American magazine or newspaper connected in some way with the armed forces will notice is the abundance of articles, reports and surveys praising the merits of the B-1 bomber. The plane is always referred to as the "best in the world," a "necessary element of strategic forces for U.S. security," a "long-awaited savior," "what the United States has been missing until now" and so forth.

The first bomber of the new B-1B series came off the assembly line in a plant in Palmdale (California) in September 1984.¹ A ceremony to mark this event was attended by then Secretary of the Air Force V. Orr, Air Force Chief of Staff General C. Gabriel and other high-level representatives of the administration, the Pentagon and industry. A message from President Reagan was read at that time, essentially stating that the new bomber would contribute to the American policy of "deterrence" and would play an important role in the strategic nuclear forces of the United States.²

The plane made its first flight in October of the same year to test its main systems. According to the reports of Air Force and Rockwell International spokesmen, the flight was successful. A week later, however, information was leaked to the press that one of the engines had failed and had to be replaced after the flight.³ This was not the first case of malfunction in the new strategic bomber (in August 1984 an experimental B-1A model, one of the four previously built bombers, crashed during a test flight near Edwards Air Force Base in California).⁴ This is precisely the model that was to be used for the experimental launching of cruise missiles. Only one of the three remaining B-1A planes is suitable for testing.

Despite the fact that the political and military-economic validity of building the new strategic bomber is being questioned with increasing frequency in the United States, the Air Force and interested segments of the military-industrial complex are making every effort to step up the program. In 1984 S. Iacobellis, the man in charge of the B-1B program at Rockwell International, stated: "We will supply the Air Force with three bombers just a year from now, and beginning in September 1986 we will be able to build four planes a month."⁵ More than 10 planes were in the process of being assembled in 1985. The first series B-1B bomber came off the assembly line 3 months ahead of schedule. The date for the delivery of the entire shipment of 100 bombers to the Air Force has also been moved up half a year. It is now believed that they will be turned over to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) before the middle of 1988.⁶ Appropriations for the production of 18 planes were envisaged in fiscal year 1984, and the 1985 budget included funds for another 34. No previous program has displayed this kind of stepped-up development of a new airborne weapon system with the parallel completion of the "design-testing-arming" cycle. What is the history of this program?

During the first 15 years after World War II, the United States first relied on its atomic monopoly and then on its overwhelming superiority in bomber aviation equipped with atomic and hydrogen bombs.

At the end of the 1940's the SAC was equipped with the first B-47 jet bomber. The number of these planes had already reached 500 by 1953 and exceeded 1,400 in 1955. In May 1953 President Eisenhower said: "We assign decisive importance to the Air Force. Next year almost 60 cents out of every dollar earmarked for national defense will be spent on the Air Force and air defense."⁷

The new B-52 strategic bomber, capable of operating directly from the American continent, began to be developed in those same years. These bombers were delivered to the Air Force from 1954 to 1962 and now constitute the basis of U.S. strategic aviation. They number around 500 in all.

In the beginning of the 1960's the SAC began receiving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), and this had a considerable effect on the distribution of funds and efforts for the development of new carriers of nuclear weapons. The Air Force command, however, continued to insist on the development of a new manned strategic bomber with supersonic flight capability. The plan for the development of this bomber was approved in 1965. The new design was called the AMSA,⁸ and planes of this type were supposed to replace the B-52's. In 1969 the Pentagon officially opened the bidding for an aircraft design meeting the requirements of the AMSA. Three airframe designs and two engine designs were considered in the final stage of the bidding. The results were announced in June 1970, and the AMSA project was renamed the B-1.

North American Aircraft Operations (Los Angeles), part of the huge Rockwell International concern, received the contract for the design and production of the airframe of the new bomber. The contract for the B-1 engines was awarded to long-time military contractor General Electric.

The U.S. Air Force originally planned to order 240 B-1's and substitute them for B-52 bombers by 1981. The first experimental model of the B-1 began to

be assembled in March 1972 at a military enterprise known as Plant 42 in Palmdale. The model was test-flown in December 1974. This was also the first test of the new turbofan engines. In all, four B-1 planes were built.

The first B-1 was used to judge the flight characteristics of the plane in general. The program consisted of 79 flights, representing more than 405 hours in the air. The second model made 60 flights (more than 282 hours) and was then put on reserve status. In 1982 the second B-1 plane made a non-stop flight from Edwards Air Force Base to England to take part in the traditional air show in Farnborough. It was refueled twice during the flight by a KC-135 tanker plane. It was in Farnborough that the English press gave the B-1 the nickname it has had since then--the "Assassin."⁹

The third and fourth B-1 models, equipped with a modern radioelectronic defense system, an improved radar surveillance system and other state-of-the-art electronic equipment, were tested for their ability to clear enemy air defense systems at minimum altitudes. Priority was assigned to the complete use of all radioelectronic equipment on the plane. The official testing program ended on 30 April 1981. By that time the third and fourth models had made 138 (over 829 hours) and 70 (378 hours) flights respectively.

In spite of the stepped-up development of the B-1 and the propaganda pressure in favor of it, the new strategic bomber program was encountering increasing resistance in the U.S. Congress and in various segments of the public. Critics pointed to the rising cost of the new bomber and its low technical flight characteristics in comparison to projected figures. The operation of one plane (along with a tanker plane) was supposed to cost 10 million dollars a year. The cost of all the B-1's ordered by the Air Force, however, was estimated by specialists at over 24.4 billion dollars.¹⁰

The opponents of the B-1 proposed several alternative weapons system projects which, in their opinion, would be more effective and economically sound. In particular, the successful development of cruise missiles put them in the lead among systems designed to break through enemy echeloned air defense systems at minimum altitudes--that is, designed to perform the function the Air Force associated directly with the B-1 bomber. In terms of cost, the cruise missile had a definite advantage over the bomber.


In an attempt to save the program, the Air Force leadership decided to link the B-1 program with the cruise missile program. According to the new plan, the cruise missiles were to be the main weapon carried by the B-1.

After testing experimental models in December 1976, the Pentagon announced that a contract had been signed for the production of the first three series B-1 bombers and the purchase of the necessary materials and equipment for the assembly of eight more planes. All of these expenditures were included in the draft budget for fiscal year 1978 by the Ford Administration in the last months of its term.

In early 1977, however, President Carter announced that the production of the new bomber would be stopped temporarily and that existing scientific and

technical potential and finances would be redirected to the development of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, and in June 1977 he decided to stop the series production of the B-1 bomber.

The Multi-Purpose Strategic B-1B Bomber



In the opinion of President Carter, an opinion shared by Secretary of Defense H. Brown, the high cost of the B-1 program was not justified by its superiority to the existing B-52 bombers, especially if the two planes were to be viewed as carriers of cruise missiles. Besides this, the constantly rising cost of the new bomber was diverting funds from military programs deemed more expedient by the administration. In August 1980 H. Brown announced that the administration had not completely renounced the idea of developing a new generation of strategic bombers and was considering a successor to the B-1--the "Stealth" plane.¹¹

In October 1981 the Reagan Administration approved a long-range program for the modernization of all components of the strategic forces, within the framework of which the United States resumed the development of the B-1 bomber, which was renamed the B-1B. On 20 January 1982 the Pentagon and Rockwell International signed a contract for a total sum of 2.2 billion dollars, with 886 million of it earmarked for the stepped-up development and production of the first models of the B-1B series. The Air Force order for 100 bombers, however, will cost 39.8 billion dollars, and the cost of each plane has been estimated by specialists at around 300 million dollars.¹²

The B-1B is a multi-purpose bomber: It can be used to break through enemy air defense systems at low altitudes and deliver strikes deep within enemy territory. Besides this, plans call for its performance of such functions as

operational and strategic air reconnaissance, battle with enemy ships, ocean patrol, airborne mining operations, etc.

In external appearance the B-1B resembles its B-1 predecessor, but it weighs almost a third more, its takeoff and landing run is longer and its wing sweep is shorter. The costly air intake regulators and cockpit emergency ejection mechanism were left out of the design of the new model. One important difference is the use of the latest radar equipment. As a result of certain changes in design and the use of new materials, the radar signal reflected by the B-1B is only one-tenth of that of the original B-1 design and is equivalent to only 1 percent of the B-52 signal.

The use of the new strategic bomber will make certain changes in the structure of U.S. strategic forces. Four Air Force bases are already re-equipped to accommodate B-1B planes, the Titan 2 ICBM's on McConnell Air Force Base in Kansas have been dismantled and several squadrons of B-52 bombers and KC-135 tanker planes have been relocated.¹³ The 96th bomber wing, located on Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, was the first subdivision to receive the B-1B bombers in 1985. By September 1986, 15 new planes are to arrive on this base.¹⁴ By the end of 1986 the B-1B will also be sent to Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, and in 1987 it will be sent to Grand Forks (North Dakota) and McConnell Air Force bases. The process should be completed in 1988.

Characteristics of Strategic B-1B Bomber

Number of crew members	4
Weight, in tons	
Maximum takeoff	around 217
Empty plane	82
Maximum payload	around 57
Flight speed, Mach number	
Maximum	1.25
Cruising (at high altitudes)	0.72
During breakthrough of enemy defense system at low altitudes	0.85
Return	0.42
Practical ceiling, meters	over 15,000
Ferrying range, kilometers	11,300
Combat radius of operation, kilometers	around 6,000
Takeoff distance, meters	2,500
Size of plane, meters	
Length	44.8
Height	10.4
Wing spread with 67.5° sweep angle	41.7
Wing spread with 15° sweep angle	23.8
Wing area, square meters	around 181

ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1985, No 10, p 45.

Although the first series B-1B planes have already come off the assembly line, the fights over the B-1B program are still going on. Recently there have been

more frequent reports in the American press about the possibility of the production of more than the originally planned 100 B-1B's. This wish has been expressed by many top-level U.S. Air Force spokesmen, especially General L. Skantze, head of the Aerospace Systems Command.¹⁵ Th

The expansion of the B-1B program is being opposed, however, by the supporters of the fundamentally new Stealth strategic bomber, the development of which has already absorbed 4 billion dollars. Defending the administration's "dual decision" to develop and use both systems (B-1B and Stealth), C. Weinberger said that 100 B-1B planes would be built and that the focus would then shift to the Stealth program.¹⁶

Since the middle of the 1980's the United States has been working on three bomber programs--B-52, B-1B and Stealth. A total of over 8 billion dollars was allocated in fiscal year 1985 for the construction of 82 B-1B planes,¹⁷ and the budget for the current fiscal year, 1986, allocates more than 5 billion dollars for the purchase of 48 more B-1B bombers.

FOOTNOTES

1. The development of this model was announced in October 1981.
2. AIRMAN, November 1984, p 43.
3. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 29 October 1984, p 16.
4. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 6 October 1984, p 836.
5. Ibid., 15 September 1984, pp 652-653.
6. Ibid., 1 December 1984, p 1503.
7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 20 May 1953.
8. AMSA--advanced manned strategic aircraft.
9. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 25 September 1982, p 916.
10. A. Quanbeck and B. Blechman, "Strategic Forces. Issues for the Mid-Seventies," Wash., 1973, pp 48-49.
11. I. O. Lavrukhin, "The 'Secrets' of the 'Stealth' Program," SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 8.
12. THE ECONOMIST, 14 November 1981, p 42; 13 April 1985, p 40.
13. AIRMAN, March 1985.
14. AIR FORCE TIMES, 5 September 1983; AIRMAN, September 1984, p 2.

15. AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, September 1985, p 126.

16. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 25 March 1985, p 13.

17. FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, 21 September 1985, p 39.

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